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PARTICULARITY AND GENERALITY:
CHALLENGES OF FEMINIST THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN WORK ON WOMAN-ABUSE
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER*
Since the beginning of the women's movement, feminist legal theory has been based
largely upon exploration and analysis of the particular, unique experiences of women's
lives, In this Article, Professor Schneider asserts that feminist theory founded exclu-
sively upon a particularity analysis is inadequate to capture the full range of women's
experience. Drawing upon her experience in the area of woman-abuse, Professor
Schneider challenges feminist theory to forge a conceptual link between particularity
and generality in order to develop both more inclusive feminist theory and more effec-
tive feminist practice.
INTRODUCTION
RECENT EXPERIENCE IN FEMINIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN WORK ON WOMAN-ABUSE
Concern with the crucial interrelationship between theory and prac-
tice in many different contexts has animated my work; I have explored
this issue particularly in the area of women's rights and feminist legal
theory.' I have argued that feminist legal theory reflects a dialectical
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1968, Bryn Mawr College; M. Sc. 1969,
The London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D. 1973, New York University Law
School. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Columbia University Workshop
on Women and Society, the Justice and Gender Conference at the University of Maine Law
School, the Northeastern University Law School Faculty Workshop, the Critical Networks
Conference: Policy in the Nineties, the Feminist Literary Theory nd Culture Seminar at
Harvard University, and the McGill Law School Legal Theory Workshop. I am grateful to
Pat Cain, Clare Dalton, Susan Herman, Sylvia Law, Jean Love, and Martha Minow, who gave
me helpful comments on previous drafts, to Stephanie Foster, Michelle Kaminsky, Michele
Lang, Kate Nicholson, Jennifer Oltarsh, Rhonda Panken, Marie-Louise Ramsdale, Rachel
Schwartz, Eve Shapiro, and Brande Stellings for their research assistance and to the students
in my Battered Women and the Law class at Harvard Law School, Spring 1991, for helping me
develop many of the ideas discussed in this article. A Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research
grant generously supported my research and writing.
1 My writing has focused on the link between theory and practice in a wide variety of
different contexts, including jurisprudence, feminist legal theory, women's rights, and legal
education. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
195 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and Changing] (focusing on tensions between
themes of victimization and agency in problem of expert testimony on battering); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589, 598-610 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics] (examining role of rights in claims for equality, reproductive choice, and protection
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interrelationship between theory and practice.2 Feminist theory rests on
the fundamental notion that women's experience is the central starting
point of theory: theory flows from experience in the world, and then
theory refines and modifies that experience.3 My previous work has em-
phasized the need for close attention to the interrelationship between the-
ory and practice in our experience of the complexity of women's lives
and in the articulation of women's experiences into legal claims.4
However, while working on a report for the Ford Foundation as-
sessing national legal reform efforts for battered women over the last sev-
eral years, I experienced a sense of disconnection between the two
dimensions of my own work, feminist theory and feminist practice.5 Re-
cent developments in feminist legal theory, both the move to "grand"
theory and the opposite extreme of personal narrative, seem incomplete
and suggest potential dissociation from the richness of feminist practice.6
from sexual harassment and battering); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political Interference in Law
School Clinical Programs: Reflections on Outside Interference and Academic Freedom, 1I
J.C. & U.L. 179 (1984) (examining problem of political interference in law school clinical
programs and resulting implications for academic freedom); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Rethink-
ing the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. Legal Educ. 41 (1987) (emphasizing the need for
greater link between theory and practice in the teaching of civil procedure, outlining some
strands of critique of procedure, and suggesting alternative approaches to civil procedure);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Task Force Reports on Women in the Courts: The Challenge for
Legal Education, 38 J. Legal Educ. 87 (March-June 1988) (arguing that state task force reports
on status of women in courts have important implications for legal education); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Violence Against Women and Legal Education: An Essay for Mary Joe Frug, 26
New Eng. L. Rev. 843 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Violence Against Women] (describing
Battered Women and the Law class and other curricular work on woman-abuse as providing
opportunity to explore interrelationship among theory and practice and scholarship and
activism).
2 See generally Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 1.
3 See id. at 601.
4 See note I supra.
5 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts to Assist Battered Women: Past,
Present and Future at 6 (1990) [hereinafter Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts] (report on file
with the New York University Law Review).
6 Martha Fmeman shares this view. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establish-
ing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 Fla. L Rev. 25 (1990) (analyz-
ing existing and emerging themes that dominate contemporary feminist legal discourse). In
this essay, she observes:
[O]n the broadest level feminist legal thought seems unanchored. It drifts between the
extremes of 'grand theory,' which is totalizing in its scope and ambitions, and personal
narratives, which begin and end with the presentation of one individual's unique exptd-
ence. Neither of these extremes does much to further the discussion of feminist issues
because they obscure more than they illuminate. Between these extremes, in that space
between something so exclusively personal as to be beyond generalization or political
content, and something so general and abstract as to be removed from the everyday
realities of women's lives, lies fertile ground for feminist methodology.
Id. at 25-26. This Article is an effort to begin to plow this "fertile ground."
Of course there are exceptions to this trend. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women
and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. Pa. L
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Indeed, despite my own best efforts to maintain the interconnection be-
tween theory and practice, I found myself moving back and forth be-
tween these two vantage points while working on this report.7 Because
the connection between women's actual experiences and the theory and
policy implications that flow out of these experiences is the unique con-
tribution that feminist legal theory can make to law,8 it is critical to high-
light this connection in both our theory and practice. This Article
attempts to forge this link by examining tensions in current feminist the-
ory and practice in legal work on woman-abuse.9
The rebirth of the women's movement in this country during the
1960s led to the development of many new areas of and perspectives on
the law.10 The contributions of the women's movement in the field of
battering have been particularly dramatic. The theoretical construct of a
"battered woman" developed only within the last twenty years. Since
this development, the battered women's movement has made important
practical strides as well. Specifically, it has focused on providing shelter
and services for battered women, educating the public about the immedi-
acy of the issue, and developing legal remedies for battered women in-
cluding orders of protection and criminal and tort remedies. The urgent
Rev. 379 (1991) (arguing against redefining substantive and procedural rules involving self-
defense claims in women's homicide trials); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (illustrating contrast
between women's lives and legal and cultural stereotypes through battered women's accounts
of woman-abuse).
7 This report evaluated national legal reform and public education advocacy efforts and
focused on reforms to assist battered women. My concern was that in both assessing current
reform efforts and envisioning new ones, feminist theory and practice often seemed to be dis-
tinct vantage points rather than interrelated.
8 See Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 1, at 601-04 (arguing that
theory is not general principle but rather is based on direct experiences).
9 This Article reflects the importance of the interrelationship between theory and practice
in several ways. First, it brings together several sources of insight on battered women that
have existed as somewhat distinct and unrelated bodies of knowledge: the experiences of bat-
tered women, battered women's activists and advocates; feminist legal theory; and social sci-
ence perspectives on battering including a growing body of feminist literature. Second, this
Article draws on and develops four distinct aspects of my own work on the interrelationship
between theory and practice. It expands on my earlier work on the dialectical interrelation-
ship between theory and practice in the women's rights movement generally. See Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 1, at 598-610. It builds on my previous explo-
ration of how feminist legal work must strive to describe women's experiences in particular,
but also allow for the possibility of change, see Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra
note 1, at 198-200, and is based on my recent practical reform-oriented work in surveying and
evaluating national advocacy efforts on behalf of battered women. Finally, it explores issues
that emerged from my efforts to link theory and practice in a class on Battered Women and the
Law. See Schneider, Violence Against Women, supra note 1.
10 For example, the women's movement articulated legal claims of sexual harassment. See
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 1, at 621 & n. 165, and fueled claims
for reproductive freedoms. See id. at 631 n.206.
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nature of this work cannot be overstated. Abuse of women by male part-
ners is the leading cause of injury to women in the United States.II One
woman in the United States is beaten every 18 seconds,' 2 and between
two and four thousand women die every year from abuse.' 3 Police in-
volvement in domestic violence cases nationally exceeds police involve-
ment in murder, rape, and all forms of aggravated assault.' 4
As I surveyed the work of the battered women's movement over the
last twenty years and met with advocates from around the country, I saw
the breadth, depth, and creativity of this work. Many groups and organi-
zations have emerged around the country to assist battered women.
They have founded shelters or networks of "safe homes,"' 5 set up
telephone hotlines, challenged police practices that fail to intervene
effectively to assist battered women,16 drafted new legislation to
protect battered women both through civil orders of protection and
criminal remedies,17 and developed programs to work with battering
11 See Women, Violence and the Law: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Chil-
dren, Youth and Families, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) (statement of Rep. George Miller).
12 See Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 23 Suffolk U. L
Rev. 575, 584 (1989) (citing U.S. Bureau of Justice statistics, 1986).
13 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice Uniform Crime Re-
ports for 1983, at 12 (1984).
14 See Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts, supra note 5.
15 Id. at 59.
16 Id. at 46-49.
17 For a discussion of the range of state civil and criminal legislation that has been devel-
oped to assist battered women, see id. at 27-44. For an analysis of state legislation regarding
restraining orders, see Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil
Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 Faro. L. Q. 43 (1989).
Major federal legislation on domestic violence includes the Victims of Crime Act of 1989
(VOCA), 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (1989), which offers compensation to victims of domestic vio-
lence, and the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1984,42 U.S.C. § 10410 (1989),
which assists states in providing services to prevent family violence, and coordinates research,
training, and clearinghouse activities.
Senator Biden has proposed federal legislation on rape and domestic violence in the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1991, which is presently being debated in Congress. See S. 15.
102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). The Violence Against Women Act is a comprehensive act con-
taining five titles. Title I, Safe Streets for Women, increases penalties for sex crimes and estab-
lishes the "National Commission on Violent Crimes Against Women." Title II, Safe Homes
for Women, protects women from domestic violence, promoting the arrest and prosecution of
abusive spouses. Title III, Civil Rights for Women, establishes a federal cause of action in civil
suits for damages and injunctive relief for victims of gender-based assaults. Title IV, Safe
Campuses for Women, allows the Department of Education to provide grants to educate cam-
puses and to hold disciplinary proceedings on campuses for abusers of women. Title V, Equal
Justice for Women in the Courts, extends the protections in the current rape shield law to
other criminal and civil crimes, and calls for the education of judges and court personnel on
topics involving violent crimes against women. See id. Although Senate Bill 15 was passed by
the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18, 1991, it did not make it to the Senate floor for a
vote in the 102nd Congress. Its counterpart, House Resolution 1502, H.R. 1502, 102nd Cong..
1st Sess. (1991), has been under consideration by five Subcommittees, and hearings have been
held by the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. Violence Against Women Act Up-
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men.18 Lawsuits have resulted in improved police and court practices.19
In addition, government reports,20 legal and social-science literature,21
and media coverage2 2 have proliferated. Advocates and scholars are also
formulating new legal approaches to violence against women. 23
date, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Oct. 30, 1992; see also Andrea I. Kelly &
Elisa A. Lang, Violence Against Women: Proposed Legislation, 1 Tex. J. of Women and the
Law 285 (1992) (summarizing history and scope of Title III of the Act).
18 For a discussion of batterers' programs and the reasons why men batter, see David Ad-
ams, Treatment Models of Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis, in Feminist Perspectives
on Wife Abuse 176, 176-96 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) [hereinafter Feminist
Perspectives]; James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in Feminist Perspectives,
supra, 133, 133-56.
19 See, e.g., Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527-28 (1). Conn. 1984) (finding
actionable equal protection claim where abused wife and son alleged city and police provided
less protection for assault victims in context of domestic relationship); Bruno v. Codd, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979) (holding that police should not automatically decline to make arrest simply because
assailant is victim's husband); Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 139 (Or. 1983) (holding that
police officers who fail to protect intended beneficiary of a judicial order can be held liable
despite defense of official immunity); but cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that state has no constitutional duty to provide members
of general public with protective services).
20 See, e.g., Attorney General of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Task Force on Family Violence,
Final Report (1984); The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1984: A Report to
Congress (1988); Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Issues and Practices, Civil
Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement (1990); Gail A.
Goolkasian, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Issues and Practices, Confronting Domestic Violence: A
Guide for Criminal Justice Agencies (1986) [hereinafter Confronting Domestic Violence]; U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Under the Rule of Thumb: Battered Women and the Administra-
tion of Justice (1982) [hereinafter Under the Rule of Thumb].
21 Examples of recent books on woman-abuse include Julie Blackman, Intimate Violence
(1989); Domestic Violence on Trial: Psychological and Legal Dimensions of Family Violence
(Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987); Edward W. Gondolf & Ellen R. Fisher, Battered Women as
Survivors: An Alternative to Treating Learned Helplessness (1988); Linda Gordon, Heroes of
Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence (1988); Lee A. Hoff, Battered
Women as Survivors (1990); Elizabeth H. Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social
Policy Against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present (1987); Lenore E, Walker,
Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds (1989); Feminist
Perspectives, supra note 18.
22 For a discussion of popular media images of woman-abuse, see Martha Minow, Words
and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 Vand. L. Rev.
1665 (1990).
23 For example, although tort remedies for battered women against abusers had histori-
cally been barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity, the demise of interspousal immu-
nity has made it possible to develop tort remedies for battered women. Because of the
potential for compensatory, pain and suffering, and punitive damage awards, tort remedies are
becoming an increasingly available remedy for some women. See generally Leonard Karp &
Cheryl L. Karp, Domestic Torts, Family Violence, Conflict and Sexual Abuse (1989 & 1990
Supplement); Laura D. Koss, Tort Litigation: A Remedy for Battered Women That Should
Not Be Ignored (March 30, 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the New York Univer-
sity Law Review).
Battering is now being articulated as a bias-motivated hate crime intended to intimidate
or injure an individual because of her gender. See Lois Copeland & Leslie R. Wolfe, Violence
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It is now a time of enormous challenge and opportunity for work on
male battering of women. Stories of women murdered by battering men
have received widespread publicity.24 Recent grants of clemency to bat-
tered women who have killed their abusers have garnered national atten-
tion.25 In states where restraining order legislation or mandatory arrest
of batterers have strengthened legal remedies, reporting rates have in-
creased dramatically; this increase suggests that the problem is even
Against Women As Bias-Motivated Hate Crime: Defining the Issues (1991); Peter Finn, Bias
Crime: A Special Target for Prosecutors, The Prosecutor, Spring 1988, at 9. In addition,
battering is defined as a civil rights violation in the proposed Violence Against Women Act of
1991. See Andrea Breneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic and
Ignored (unpublished manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review); note 17
supra. Both of those approaches are premised on a rejection of the notion that domestic vio-
lence is private, but assert instead the public dimension of the harm. One commentator has
suggested the applicability to battered women of the legal framework of involuntary servitude
in the thirteenth amendment in which an individual is coerced through use of or threatened
physical force in providing services against her will. See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Meta-
phor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 Yale J. L. &
Feminism 207, 210 (1992).
Finally, advocates have begun to articulate battering as a violation of international human
rights, which again challenges the public/private dichotomy. See Charlotte Bunch, Women's
Rights As Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 Human Rts. Q. 486
(1990); Symposium, Violence Against Women: Addressing a Global Problem (Ford Founda-
tion Women's Program Forum, 1992); Dorothy Q. Thomas and Michele Q. Beasley, Domestic
Violence As a Human Rights Issue (unpublished manuscript on file with the New York Uni-
versity Law Review).
24 See Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts, supra note 5, at 13.
25 Newspapers across the country have recorded developments in the clemency cases. See
Kay Bartlett, Spousal Homicide Law: "Open Season" on Men--or "Domestic Violence?"
L.A. Times, Mar. 17, 1991, at A33; Governor Orders Review of Abuse Convictions, Wash.
Times, May 20, 1991, at A2; Stan Grossfeld, "Safer" and in Jail: Women Who Kill Their
Batterers, Boston Globe, Sept. 2, 1991, at 1; Mary O'Doherty, Death Sought in "Battered
Woman" Case, U.S.A. Today, Sept. 13, 1991, at 3A Andi Rierden, Citing Abuse, Women Ask
for Clemency in Killings, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1991, Sec. 12 CN, at 1.
In January 1991, Ohio Governor Richard Celeste, before leaving office, first granted clem-
ency to twenty-six battered women incarcerated for killing or assaulting their batterers. See
Governor Orders Review of Abuse Convictions, supra, at A2. Governors in Maryland, Ili-
nois, New Hampshire, Louisiana, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Washington granted clemency
to a total of 17 women soon afterwards. See O'Doherty, supra, at A3. The governors of
Arizona, Massachusetts, Delaware, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Florida, Connecticut, Texas,
New York, and California have all considered similar grants.
Two of these governors, Celeste of Ohio and Schaefer of Maryland, have been criticized
for their decisions to grant clemency. See Tamar Lewin, Criticism of Clemency May Affect
Efforts to Free Battered Women, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1991, at A17. Some commentators
believe such criticism stems from the perception that pardoned women did not fit the mold of
the "perfect victim":
One of the problems with these cases is that everyone expects the perfect clean victim...
and no one is perfectly clean. That's a reason why a lot of these women plead guilty and
don't go to trial.
Id, see also text accompanying notes 119-26 infra (discussing imprecision in describing bat-
tered women as agent or victim).
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more pervasive than previously imagined.26 However, at the same time
that legal reform efforts have expanded, public response to clemency ef-
forts has rekindled a national debate on issues of violence against women
and women's "retaliation. ' 27 In addition, Professor Anita Hill's experi-
ence in alleging sexual harassment against Supreme Court nominee Clar-
ence Thomas has underscored the tenacity of views of women as
"unreasonable" and provocative.
This recent attention, these underlying tensions, as well as my own
work in surveying national legal reform efforts for battered women,28
suggest a need for examination of the theoretical and strategic implica-
tions of recent work on woman-abuse.29 New experiences with and un-
derstandings of woman-abuse in practice compel us to rethink some of
our original assumptions. Feminist theorists and practitioners must con-
front the theoretical implications of strategic choices and the strategic
implications of theoretical choices in women's rights litigation. It is our
task both to "describe" and allow for "change": describe a legal problem
for women-describe it in detail, in context-and translate it to unsym-
pathetic courts in such a way that it is not misheard, and at the same
time does not remain static. We must develop legal theory and practice
that are accurate to the realities of women's experiences but that also
take account of complexity and allow for change.30
26 Although woman battering is an underreported and underrecorded crime, the passage of
comprehensive laws protecting battered women has been associated with an increase in rc-
corded incidents of violence. The state of Connecticut provides one example. Connecticut
enacted a comprehensive Family Violence Prevention and Response Act in 1986. Conn. Gen.
Stat. §§ 46b- 15, 466-38 a to f, 54-Ig (1986) (codified as amended at 1991 Conn. Pub. Act 91-
381). Prior to the passage of this Act, arrests reported by police ranged from 7000 to 9000
batterers each year. See generally Connecticut Department of Human Resources, 1985 Do-
mestic Violence Arrest Report. By contrast, after the passage of the Act, arrests increased
dramatically, to 22,912 reported in 1990. See Family Violence Arrests, 1990 Annual Report,
Excerpt from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program publication, Crime in Connecticut 1990,
Family Violence Reporting Program, Department of Public Safety. This phenomenon has to
do both with improved police response to reports by battered women and improved record
keeping on the part of the police. One of the mandates of the Act was the establishment of a
Family Violence Reporting Unit with the Department of Public Safety. The earlier figures
were taken from reports made to the Department of Human Resources, while the latter figures
in 1990 were gathered by the established unit acting pursuant to statutory mandate.
Other states have noted a similar increase in reported violence. See, e.g., Stan Grossfeld,
Women Suffer War on the Home Front: Love and Terror, Boston Globe, Sept. 1, 1991, at MI
(noting jump in reported incidents of domestic violence in Boston from 5023 in 1986 to 9112 in
1990, and similar increase in police arrests under laws in force in Massachusetts).
27 See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
28 See Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts, supra note 5.
29 As I have recently discussed elsewhere, that examination should include re-conceptual-
ization of some basic theoretical frameworks, such as the meaning of "privacy" for women
who have been battered. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 U. Conn. L.
Rev. 973, 983 (1991).
30 See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1.
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Moving between theory and practice in work on woman-abuse
reveals an underlying paradox in feminist theory: feminist theoretical
work must simultaneously be more richly "particular" in documenting
women's experiences, as well as more "general," linking violence against
women to women's subordination within society and to more general so-
cial problems of abuse of power and control. 3' This Article underscores
the need to look at women's real life situations in context, while holding
on to both particularity-the particular experiences of women who are
battered by men-and generality, broader understandings of the problem
of violence and gender. I use the term "particularity" in this Article to
mean the importance of describing the complexity of women's exper-
iences non-simplistically, accurately, and in greater detail. In the context
of woman-abuse, this means that we must both understand the dimen-
sions of the problems that are unique and particular to women, and at
the same time explore the more "general" dimensions of the problem.
Here I discuss "general" dimensions in two senses: first, the way in
which woman-abuse must be viewed as linked to larger problems of soci-
etal violence; and, second, as linked to women's subordination in general.
Exploration of the dimensions of both particularity and generality in
feminist theory and feminist practice is necessary to the development of
feminist legal work.
This argument is likely to be controversial, perhaps even heretical,
for several reasons. First, feminist theory has largely been premised on a
notion that feminist work emerges out of women's particular and unique
experiences. Thus it could be said that feminist theory has been based on
a "particularity" strand of analysis and on denial, sometimes even rejec-
tion, of the "general." This tendency is heightened in the area of male
violence against women, which is premised on a theoretical framework
based on gender subordination and thus understood as gender-specific.
Second, in the early stages of the battered women's movement, there has
been a strategic need for and success with certain definitional categories
and certain characterizations of battered women's experiences; it is un-
settling to challenge these familiar categories and characterizations. Fi-
nally, feminist legal theory has correctly focused on the importance and
specificity of women's situated experience. Recent criticism of the ten-
dency toward essentialism within feminist legal theory underscores the
importance of this emphasis on particularity and even argues for a
greater degree of particularity in our descriptions of "women's" experi-
ence.32 The danger in moving away from particularity and into general-
31 Martha Minow helped me formulate this characterization of the tension between partic-
ularity and generality in feminist theory.
32 See generally Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Fem-
inist Thought (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
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ization is that the specificity and richness of women's situated experience
will be eliminated and proposed reforms or theories premised on more
general understandings will become irrelevant or be mistaken. For these
reasons, generalization, or what I call the move to generality, has been
viewed as suspect.
In this Article, I argue that an exclusive focus on particularity is
problematic for feminist legal theory. While generalization poses a real
danger, focus only on particularity and failure to make the conceptual
link to generality limits the development of a richer and more textured
feminist theory and practice. In this sense, the Article resonates with
and develops the work of feminist legal theorists and others working
within the pragmatic legal tradition who have explored the importance of
context, articulated the need for a self-reflective woman-centered stance
that simultaneously moves beyond women's experiences, and identified
the interrelationship between the particular and the general. 33
As the Article will demonstrate, it is also necessary to make the link
between the "particular" and the "general" because, as we honestly ex-
plore the deeply "particular" aspects of women's experience, we are
faced with theoretical contradictions which force us to confront more
"general" issues. However, this relationship between particularity and
generality is dialectical and must be understood as an aspect of the dia-
lectical relationship between theory and practice that I have previously
described as essential to feminist legal theory.34 The particular illumi-
nates the general and the general then gives a context and depth to our
understanding of particularity. Linking the particular with the general is
also an effort both to acknowledge situatedness and to seek commonal-
ity.35 Thus, I argue for a more detailed particularity and a more inclu-
sive generality as important for the development of feminist legal theory
and practice.
Through a detailed examination of issues posed by male battering of
women, this Article demonstrates the need for feminist theory to address
Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990) (criticizing feminist theorists relying on "gender essentialism" as
silencing voices of black women).
33 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 (1990)
(offering approach of "positionality" which incorporates situational and provisional experience
into concept of truth); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1597 (1990) (examining ways in which phrase "in context" is used to critique theories calling
for increased awareness of context in social problems, and discussing particular/gcneral
relationship).
34 See Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 1.
35 See comment of Jean Love, Afterword: Transcriptions of Comments made During the
Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, held on February
23-24, 1990 at the University of Southern California Law Center, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1911, 1925
(1990) (noting that pragmatism may offer link between general idealism and practical human-
ist solution-seeking).
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both particularity and generality. Part I examines various problems in
the dilemma of defining the problem of male battering of women. By
raising questions about the theoretical and strategic implications of vari-
ous categories of description, this Part documents the strategic necessity,
at least historically, of formulation of a particular category called "bat-
tered woman"; at the same time it shows how that category is ultimately
confining. Part II then considers new dilemmas posed by the crucial the-
oretical tension in work on woman-abuse: the victim/agent dichotomy.
This Part argues that issues of battered women's responsibility for chil-
dren, the societal focus on their obligation to leave the abusive relation-
ship, and fundamental issues concerning battered women as
"reasonable" reveal the complexity and instability of the victimization
and agency dichotomy and are linked to larger issues of gender subordi-
nation. Both Parts I and II illuminate the need for women's experiences
of battering to be described with particularity, with a greater attention to
the details and complexity of women's lives, and to be linked to more
general issues and to women's subordination within society. Both Parts
describe the unique manner in which practice in this field informs theory
and theory in turn redefines practice. Finally, Part MI explores the im-
plications for feminist theory and practice of consideration of both the
particularity and generality of experience.
I
THE DILEMMA OF DEFINITION
This Part explores the theoretical and strategic implications of
choices in naming the problem of male battering of women. Section A
examines the meaning and utility of the phrase "battered woman," and
then examines the problem of essentialism in work on battered women.
Next, Section B explores the tension between the practical need to define
battering as physical abuse and the theoretical need to present the full
range of battering experiences as a continuum of abuse of power and
control. Section C moves on to explore another aspect of definition-not
battering itself, but who is doing the battering and in what context.
Through a discussion of lesbian and gay male battering and elder abuse,
this Section shows how feminist definitions of battering as male domina-
tion are compatible with a more general definition of battering as power
and control in intimate relationships generally.
A. The Concept of "Battered Woman"
L Terminology Surrounding Battering
One of the most notable contributions of the women's movement
has been its articulation of the concept of battering. At the same time,
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the recognition of "battering"-the discovery of a harm experienced by
women that was previously unnamed-also described a person, a "bat-
tered woman." This term, which we now take for granted, raises critical
definitional issues related to understanding the problem of battering and
highlights serious strategic issues related to use of this terminology.
First, in contrast with other descriptions of harm to women, "bat-
tered woman" describes the victim and focuses on her qualities. A
woman is-or is not-a "battered woman." The phrase is reductive in
that it totally defines the life experience of the particular woman: a "bat-
tered woman" is nothing more than a "battered womam."
Significantly, women resist applying the term "battered woman" to
themselves-even when approaching hot lines and shelters, seeking tem-
porary restraining orders against abusers, or talking to other women. 36
For example, at a National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
(NCADV) conference several years ago, Susan Schechter observed that
in her work with battered women in shelters and in hospital emergency
rooms, women who had been battered were largely reluctant to identify
themselves as "battered women" and frequently rejected the application
of the term to themselves. 37
This reluctance suggests that the term "battered woman" has a re-
strictive meaning-a meaning that defines a woman exclusively in terms
of her battering experience. Moreover, women's reluctance also suggests
that the term produces a negative image from which an individual
woman may have a strong need to distance herself: a "battered woman"
is someone else. This argument becomes clearer when one compares the
static term "battered woman" to the phrase, "woman who has been sexu-
ally harassed," or even "sexual harassment victim," or "woman who has
been raped" or even "rape victim." Despite the problematic characteri-
zation of the term "victim," ' 38 these phrases describe a woman who has
been subjected to an external harm: they focus on the problem of the
harm-the batterer, the rapist-and leave the woman intact. In contrast,
"battered woman" defines all that a woman is in a way that fails to com-
municate the range and complexity of her experiences. This term makes
her, not the experiences that she has suffered, the problem. We reinforce
this interpretation by talking about "problems of battered women,"
rather than focusing on and discussing male battering of women. 39
36 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 25.
37 See Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Bat-
tered Women's Movement 252 (1982); Mahoney, supra note 6, at 8.
38 See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 221 (quoting S. Schechter,
supra note 37, at 252).
39 See Christine Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspec-
tives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 23 (using phrase "male battering of
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Advocates echo this concern by suggesting a more accurate, less to-
talizing description: "a woman who has (or had) a relationship with a
battering man."4 Consider the difference in meaning that this phrase
conveys. Many women experience relationships with controlling men.41
Accordingly, to use the term "women who have had relationships with
controlling men" accurately covers a large number of women. This al-
ternative terminology describes the woman as a survivor of a relationship
with a controlling man, rather than defining the totality of a woman by
the behavior of the man with whom she has a relationship. Much recent
work on battering emphasizes women's survival skills and resources and
characterizes battered women as survivors, not victims.
The totalizing impact of the term "battered woman" may also be
grounded in negative social stereotypes that accompany the description
of battering. Public experience with the meaning of the term "battered
woman" has been shaped by association with the concept of "battered
woman syndrome" in criminal trials involving battered women who have
fought against their abusers. In many such cases, experts have testified
that there is a "battered woman syndrome" that has been commonly un-
derstood to define battered women as suffering from a kind of helpless-
ness which makes them unable to leave. Thus, the term "battered
woman" conjures up images of helplessness and defeat rather than sur-
vival and resistance. Neither the term itself, then, nor the social meaning
of the term derived from practice, describe the complexity of battered
women's experiences.
2. Battered Women and Essentialism
Just as the term "battered woman" is a static, inaccurate account of
the many life experiences of a woman who has been battered, so too is the
notion that there exists one paradigmatic "battered woman." Feminist
legal theory has become more sensitized to the problem of essentialism-
the view that there is one single "woman's" experience. Many feminist
critics have written powerfully about the way in which the notion of wo-
manhood has been described as a single uniform experience, and the way
in which that has excluded a multiplicity of experiences based on race,
class, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, and other dimensions.42 This
women").
40 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 25.
41 Indeed, two battered women's advocates have recently written a book to assist women
who are in relationships with controlling men. See Ann Jones & Susan Schechter, When Love
Goes Wrong (1992).
42 See, e.g., E. Spelman, supra note 32, at ix (arguing that notion of generic "woman"
"obscures the heterogeneity of women and cuts off examination of the significance of such
heterogeneity for feminist theory and political activity"); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender
and Violence Against Women: Convergences, Divergences and Other Black Feminist Conun-
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problem of essentialism is one of the reasons why the term "battered
woman" is so problematic. 43
It is crucial that our theoretical framework be expanded, and traps
of essentialist thinking avoided, for in practice battered women are not
all similarly situated. The variety of pressures shaping the battered
woman's experience are often linked to the specific dynamics of the com-
munity in which the abuse occurs. Thus, efforts to aid battered women
must be tailored to meet their differing needs.
One popular stereotypical misconception concerning the problem of
woman-abuse is that most women who are battered are poor and/or
women of color.44 To the contrary, battering appears to cut across class,
racial, and ethnic lines.45 At the same time, within the battered women's
movement, work on battering has been largely shaped by the experience
and understanding of white women. Recently, however, battered
women's advocates and women of color have done considerable work in
expanding definitions and perspectives. 46
drums - Stan. L. Rev. - (forthcoming, manuscript on file with the New York University
Law Review); Christine E. Rasche, Minority Women and Domestic Violence: The Unique
Dilemmas of Battered Women of Color, 4 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 150 (1986) (examining gap
in research on domestic violence which does not address special problems which racial, ethnic
or cultural minority women encounter when dealing with abuse from their partners); Beth
Richie, Battered Black Women: A Challenge for the Black Community, 16 The Black Scholar
40 (March/April 1985) (discussing battering by examining battered minority women's
perspectives).
43 See Harris, supra note 32.
44 See Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 1258-59.
45 Id. However, Kimberle Crenshaw raises an interesting point regarding the lack of relia-
ble statistical evidence about the incidence of battering across race and class lines, thereby
challenging the assumption that battering is not predominantly a problem of the poor and
people of color. "No reliable statistics bear out [the] claim ... that it is equally a problem
across races and classes .... [S]tatistics that do address the issue suggest that there is a greater
frequency of violence among the working class and poor which, in turn, translates to overall
rates that are higher for minorities who are disproportionately poor." Id. at 1259 n.60.
Crenshaw's argument is extremely provocative because of its focus not on the issue of
battering as existing across classes and races, but rather on why feminist scholars feel com-
pelled to assert this claim, why it is so crucial in the discourse surrounding battering to assert
continually that battering happens to people "like us." She concludes that such tactics,
although obviously useful in raising the consciousness of the white community, reinforce the
"otherness" of women of color. See id. at 1260. This assertion acts not to encourage the
exploration of the incidence of domestic abuse in communities of color, but rather as an obsta-
cle that must be surmounted before focusing resources on the battering that occurs in white
and upper- and middle-class homes. See id. at 1260-61. The bottom line is that a significant
gap exists in the discourse and literature about battering in communities of color.
46 A serious dearth of information exists concerning battering and women of color, but
activists and scholars are beginning to point out this deficiency and raise issues specific to the
intersection of these concerns. See generally Jo-Ellen Asbury, African -American Women in
Violent Relationships: An Exploration of Cultural Differences, in Violence in the Black Fam-
ily 89 (Robert L. Hampton ed., 1987) (describing "experiences of African-American women in
violent relationships from an Afrocentric perspective"); Soraya M. Coley & Joyce 0. Beckett,
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Kimberle Crenshaw, for example, has discussed how women of
color in violent relationships are doubly affected by the subordination of
both their race and gender.47 The intersection of racism and sexism ex-
acerbates many problems commonly faced by women in a battering rela-
tionship. For example, the racial bias inherent in the housing market
and the disparities between black and white women's earning power in-
crease the difficulties confronting a woman of color attempting to leave a
battering relationship.4 A worker in a shelter serving a predominantly
black population reported that nearly eighty-five percent of her clients
returned to the battering relationship because of the difficulties posed by
finding housing and employment. 49 Crenshaw suggests that although vi-
olence is a common issue among women, such violence usually occurs
within a context that varies according to the race, class, and other social
Black Battered Women: A Review of Empirical Literature, 66 L of Counseling and Dev. 266
(Feb. 1988) (reviewing literature available on "black battered women"); Soraya M. Coley &
Joyce 0. Beckett, Black Battered Women: Practice Issues, Social Casework, 69 J. Contemp.
Soc. Work 483 (1988) (addressing how black battered women "may have unique needs in
regard to community outreach, shelter services, shelter environment, shelter policies, staff
training and counseling"); Crenshaw, supra note 42 (addressing perspective of battered women
of color); Rasche, supra note 42 (same); Richie, supra note 42 (same).
The authors of Violence in the Lives of Latina Women write that the "absence of informa-
tion about Latina women reflects the triple burden of discrimination under which we function
in this society.. ." Angela Ginorio & Jane Reno, Violence in the Lives of Latina Women,
Working Together to Prevent Sexual and Domestic Abuse 1 (1985). Nilda Rimonte has em-
phasized the relationship within the Asian community between the resistance to reporting
domestic violence and commonly held attitudes toward family honor. See Crenshaw, supra
note 42, at 29 (citing Nilda Rimonte, Domestic Violence Against Pacific-Asians, Making
Waves 328 (1989)); Nilda Rimonte, Cultural Sanction of Violence Against Women in the Pa-
cific-Asian Community, - Stan. L. Rev. - (forthcoming, manuscript on file with the New
York University Law Review).
In Black Battered Women: Practice Issues, the authors report that a search of the psy-
chological and sociological abstracts from 1967 to 1987 garnered only four citations that men-
tioned black battered women. Coley & Beckett, supra, at 483. Their Article begins a
discussion of how the particular circumstances of the black community may make the infor-
mation and services about battering modeled on white women's experiences inappropriate.
Black women may analyze their experience of physical abuse differently, focusing on a race
perspective which attempts to understand the battering of the "displaced aggression of the
black male." Id. at 486. Richie's research finds a similar analysis predominant among a group
of battered minority women she observed. Richie, supra note 42, at 42.
Although this outlook challenges the traditional framework of gender subordination. it is
absolutely critical that this point of view be understood, for it affects how women identify their
experience, what services they utilize to address the problem, and what services they would use
if available. Women of color may believe that the means to ending their abuse is to end racial
oppression, not gender subordination. The battered women's movement as it has been con-
structed may not speak to their experiences at all.
47 See Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 1245-49; see also Sharon Allard, Rethinking Battered
Women Syndrome: 1 UCLA Women's L. J. 191, 196-200 (1991) (asserting that black women
must overcome stereotypes about both race and gender).
49 See Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 1245-46.
49 See id.
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characteristics of the woman.50 The model of battering we construct, in
emphasizing the power dynamics of gender subordination, must be tem-
pered with a recognition of the other forces which shape the battering
relationship.
Besides the difficulties of finding housing and employment, institu-
tional racism and its impact on communities of color is felt acutely by the
battered woman who locates her experiences not only as an abused indi-
vidual but as an abused person who is a member of an abused commu-
nity. Crenshaw documents a search for specific statistics about battering
and race which leads her to conclude that pressure to minimize or sup-
press the problem of domestic violence in the African-American commu-
nity may reflect a desire to maintain community integrity and to
discourage the perception of black men as uncontrollably violent.51 Beth
Richie voices similar concerns about the already existing level of negative
perceptions about the black community.5 2 Richie argues that battered
black women are often caught in the "trap called loyalty."5 3 In such a
climate, "[d]isclosure is so easily confused with treason" 5 4 Furthermore,
for a community that has experienced violence at the hands of the crimi-
nal justice system, it is deeply problematic to turn now to this same sys-
tem "as a vehicle for protection and problem resolution."55 Angela
Harris suggests that black women are also likely to view the criminal
justice system with suspicion because of its historical tendency to "ignore
violence against [black] women while perpetrating it against [black]
men."' 56 As one counselor reported, "Not only do we fear that we will be
mistreated by the institutions, but that our men will be also. We want
the violence in our homes to stop but we do not want to contribute in any
way to the unjust treatment of our race or ethnic community."57
The particular community in which abuse occurs often shapes
women's reactions. For example, counselors who work within the Asian
community note a general reluctance to report batteiing.58 This reluc-
tance, they posit, partly reflects an imperative to avoid bringing shame on
the family.5 9 Counselors who work within Latino communities report
50 See id.
51 See id. at 1256-57.
52 See Richie, supra note 42, at 40.
53 Id. at 41.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 43.
56 Harris, supra note 32, at 601 (footnote omitted).
57 Rasche, supra note 42, at 160 (quoting M. Garcia, Double Jeopardy: Battered Women
of Color, 11 Wives Tales: A Newsletter About Ending Violence Against Women in the Home
1, 1-2 (1985)).
58 See Rimonte, supra note 46, at 1313-15.
59 See id. at 1317-19.
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that a similar concern about focusing shame on the family contributes to
the tendency to keep the problem a private, internal one.60
The plight of battered immigrant women tragically dramatizes how
the context in which abuse occurs affects the woman's options. Con-
strained not only by their gender, but by their illegal status, batteredimmigrant women are subject to even more power wielded by their hus-
bands. The Marriage Fraud Amendments of the 1986 Immigration Act
reinforced the structural dependence of the immigrant wife by requiring
that she wait two years before being granted permanent residency, and
that both spouses file jointly.61 The potential for abuse is all too obvious.
In one marriage, the woman, a Chinese immigrant, reported that her
husband beat her, threatening, "You do exactly what I say, or I'll call
imnigration. ' 6 2  A counselor recounted the experience of another
woman "who has been hospitalized... but she keeps coming back to him
because he promises he will file for her .... He holds that green card
over her head."'63 Although the amendments to the Act have provided a
waiver for women in situations of abuse,64 the waiver presupposes the
ability of the woman to seek help and to acquire all the necessary
documentation.
B. Battering as Physical Abuse
Thinking about definitional problems in the term "battered woman"
implicates the issue of the definition of battering. Many feminists have
noted that the terms that we use-whether "domestic violence," "family
violence," "wife-beating," "woman-abuse," "battering," "battered
woman," or "male battering of women"-carry different meanings and
accordingly define the problem differently. 65 The definitions of battering
60 See A. Ginorio & J. Reno, supra note 46, at 198-99.
61 See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L 99-639, § 216, 100 Stat.
3537, 3538 (1986).
62 Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 1247 n.21 (citing Mail-Order Brides Marry Pain to Get
Green Cards, Wash. Times, Apr. 16, 1991, at El).
63 Id. at 1248 n.28.
64 The Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-232, § 302, 105
Stat. 1733, 1745 (1991).
65 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kelly, How Women Define Their Experiences of Violenc, in Femi-
nist Perspectives, supra note 18, at 130 (stressing importance of language in defining and shap-
ing our conceptions of violent acts); Littleton, supra note 39, at 27 n.18 (observing that denial
of sexism has replaced terms but has not solved problem); Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf
of Battered Women, 5 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 7, 8 (1978) (discussing terminology problem).
Laurie Woods has suggested that-
The naming of the problem [of men beating women] ... reflects one's view of the causes
of the problem, and it restricts ones perception of the nature of the problem. None of
the terms currently used to name the problem are satisfactory. The violence is not con-
fined to acts by husbands against wives. Women who are not married may also be sub-
jected to violence by the men in their lives so terms like wife-abuse and wife-assault are
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that social scientists and battered women's activists traditionally have
adopted focus on physical abuse. 66 A battered woman is a woman who is
hit or hurt repeatedly, or against whom weapons are used.67 Definitions
of battering may involve the amount or type of hitting or intensity of
hitting. It may link hitting with rape or other forms of sexual abuse or
other types of violence.6 8
Feminists' theoretical work on battered women traditionally stresses
male domination within the marital relationship and concepts of male
ownership of women in marriage as the basis of woman abuse. 69 Yet in
the early articulation of the experience of battered women and the trans-
lation of that experience into a legal concept, emphasizing the physical
dimension of the abuse was critically important because society was more
willing to redress real, physical hurt.70 Moreover, physical harm was an
easier route to establishing and legitimating the notion that women were
the subjects of abuse and that physical battering was something particu-
lar, serious, and unique that happened to women.71 Definitions of what
under-inclusive. The terms woman-abuse, woman-assault and woman-battering all fo-
cus on the woman and ignore the man, who is, after all, the problem.
Woods, supra, at 8. More recently, Christine Littleton has observed:
Both the traditional and the quasi-egalitarian labels seem to me to miss the point. First,
wives are battered as members of the class of women; wife battering is therefore gender
related in a way that is different from occasional violence against men. Second...
treating battering as 'the problem' of the person who is battered (whether she is called
woman, wife or spouse) obscures the responsibility of the batterer. Why isn't battery
considered "the problem" of violent husbands?
Littleton, supra note 39, at 27 n.18.
66 See, e.g., Feminist Perspectives, supra note 18, at 12 (defining "wife abuse" as use of
physical force by cohabitating partner); Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse or
Mutual Combat? A Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in Feminist Perspectives,
supra note 18, at 94 (defining term "battered woman" to include women who are subjected to
all forms of physical force by their intimate partners who intend to hurt them) (emphasis
added).
67 See, e.g., Angela Browne, When Battered Women Kill 13 (1987) (distinguishing and
defining terms "battering," "violence," "abuse," and "assault").
68 See Saunders, supra note 66, at 94 (documenting range of severity from slaps to beating
to use of weapons).
69 Feminists defined violence committed by a husband against his wife through the exami-
nation of the power structure within their relationship. Because society believes men to be the
"power carriers" of the couple, "wife abuse" was accepted as a means of subordination. See
Michele Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An Introduction, in Feminist Perspec-
tives, supra note 18, at 14. Feminists have also argued that "wife abuse" is related to the belief
that women are legally bound to their husbands. See id. at 14-15; see also Under the Rule of
Thumb, supra note 20, at 1-3 (linking origin of wife abuse to advent of marriage, whereby
women became property of, and were subjugated to, husbands).
70 Although sensitive to the range of physical and psychological abuse present in battering
relationships, advocates historically focused on physical violence because it affects qualitative
changes in intimate relationships and amplifies the impact of psychological abuse.
71 Even Lenore Walker, one of the leading psychologists in the field, places emphasis on
the repetition of violence in the relationship by classifying a woman as a "battered woman"
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has become known as "woman abuse" or "battering" thus focused
largely on the type, extent, and frequency of physical abuse.
Significantly, over the last ten years, the focus on abuse as primarily
physical has shifted and broadened. 72 This broader description has sev-
eral dimensions but is premised primarily on an understanding of coer-
cive behavior and power and control, rather than "number of hits," as
the critical definition of battering relationships. 73 As the battered
women's movement continues to develop, practical experience is blurring
the distinction between physical abuse and other aspects of the battering
relationship. First, with exploration of the widespread experience of
marital rape, observers have realized that physical abuse and sexual
abuse within intimate relationships overlap significantly. 74 Second, expe-
only if the couple has gone through the "battering cycle" at least twice. See Mahoney, supra
note 6, at 28-29 (citing Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman xv (1979)).
72 See generally S. Schechter, supra note 37, at 29-52 (identifying wife beating as control-
ling behavior that perpetuates the imbalance of power between men and women). See also R.
Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Research as Social Action: The Struggle for Battered
Women, in Feminist Perspectives, supra note 18, at 58-59 (discussing failure of many studies
on wife battering which examine only level and quantity of violence without considering its
historical and social context).
73 See Bell Hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black 87-88 (1989) (argu-
ing that terms such as "battered" reflect biases because they call attention to only one type of
violence in intimate relationships by emphasizing continuous physical assaults); Adams, supra
note 18, at 191 (noting that power and control are fundamental issues where controlling behav-
ior creates and maintains imbalance between batterer and battered and arguing that physical
contact is not necessary since intimidating acts can achieve same results); Kelly, supra note 65,
at 114-15 (advocating understanding sexual violence as a continuum because "distinctions
between 'sexual' and 'physical' assaults are... false and/or arbitrary"); Susan Schechter,
Building Bridges Between Activists, Professionals, and Researchers, in Feminist Perspectives,
supra note 18, at 310 (criticizing tendency to define battering relationships by numerical crite-
ria, thereby ignoring power dynamics of relationships); Kersti Yllo, Political and Methodologi-
cal Debates in Wife Abuse Research, in Feminist Perspectives, supra note 18, at 28
(recognizing that power and control can constitute another element of battering and degrada-
tion within a physically violent relationship).
The experiences of a woman in one of Liz Kelly's studies illustrate the inadequacy of the
word "battering" to describe abusive behavior which encompassed more than severe physical
violence: "What he did wasn't exactly battering but it was the threat. I remember one night I
spent the whole night in a state of terror, nothing less than terror all night .... And that was
worse to me than getting whacked .... " Kelly, supra note 65, at 120 (emphasis in original).
Kelly's research demonstrated the pervasiveness of the tendency to identify battering by the
quantifiability and frequency of physical acts, particularly by those experiencing the abuse.
Many of the women refused to define their experiences as domestic violence as long as the
abuse remained infrequent. See id. at 127.
74 See David Finkelhor & Kersti Yllo, License to Rape: Sexual Abuse of Wives 22-24
(1987) (concluding that marital rape or sexual abuse was another form of abuse that character-
ized battering relationships); Diana E.H. Russell, Rape in Marriage 90-91 (1990) (revealing
that in about one-half of marriages where wives are abused, wife beating is a major problem, in
one-fourth wife rape is principal form of abuse, and in one-fifth wife rape and battering are of
equal magnitude); Elizabeth A. Stanko, Intimate Intrusions: Women's Experience of Male
Violence 51 (1985) (concluding that sexual intimidation and violence toward women goes hand
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rience with battering men who have entered groups that treat their bat-
tering suggests that even men whose physically abusive behavior has
been modified and who have stopped hitting do not stop extreme harass-
ment, threatening behavior, and obsessive forms of control over
women.7" Third, the expansion of understandings of battering outside
the heterosexual context-of battering within lesbian and gay male com-
munities and battering of elderly persons-also has redefined our under-
standing of battering as something which is not unique to male/female
relations but is part of larger problems of power and control within inti-
mate relationships generally. 76
This revised definition of battering thus sees physical, mental, and
emotional abuse as intimately and integrally connected to issues of power
and control. Defining battering as part of an ongoing continuum is es-
sential, but has complex ramifications. A more expansive definition is
critical, because it is more inclusive and accurate to the experience of
women in relationships with battering men; this definition recognizes
that physical abuse does not exist in isolation. However, although this
revised definition of battering more fully describes the range of exper-
iences of women who are beaten, it complicates the argument that
women who have been physically battered are a distinct group with
unique problems. In other words, by collapsing the distinction between
physical abuse and other forms of abuse within intimate relationships,
battered women become like everyone else. Since all relationships in-
volve issues of power and control, practical difficulties thus arise in differ-
entiating battered women's experiences from women's experiences within
heterosexual relationships, or, as we have expanded our understanding,77
within relationships generally. Judges, jurors, and legislators, finally
convinced that battered women indeed have suffered serious harm, may
in hand with physical intimidation and violence).
Diana Russell's study found that physical violence employed by the husbands often en-
sured future submission by their wives, such that although the act of intercourse would not be
called rape by the woman, it was forced intercourse accomplished through the threat of force.
One woman described her husband's actions: "[He used his arms and body to pin me down so
I couldn't move. With all of the violence that had occurred before-him beating me all the
time-I was afraid of him when he told me I better not move." D. Russell, supra, at 94. The
typologies Russell provides are useful for they encompass the continuum of violence, both
sexual and physical, which constitute the different forms of abuse that occur in violent rela-
tionships, instead of setting up artificial distinctions between rape and battering.
75 See Ellen Pence & Melanie Shepard, Integrating Feminist Theory and Practice: The
Challenge of the Battered Women's Movement, in Feminist Perspectives, supra note 18, at
282. For an overview of the possibilities and pitfalls of programs which seek to treat men who
batter, see Adams, supra note 18, at 177-95.
76 For a discussion of abuse within lesbian and gay male communlties and elder abuse, see
text and accompanying notes 84-118 infra. This Article does not discuss child abuse because
the focus here is on abuse in intimate adult relationships.
77 See text accompanying notes 84-108 infra (discussing lesbian and gay male battering).
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begin to question their understanding of distinctness once the definition
of battering becomes more nebulous and more universal.
Given the power of judicial, legislative, and juror denial as a barrier
to recognition of battering as a serious issue, this revised definition of
battering poses serious strategic problems. The concept of battering ar-
ticulated as a special category of experience has played an enormously
important role in gaining public recognition and legal rights. At the
same time, establishing and legitimating battering as a serious problem
has been incredibly difficult because battering forces jurors in battered
women self-defense cases, judges in restraining order cases, legislators,
and the general public to challenge images of the family as a haven in a
heartless world. The threat that battering poses to traditional notions of
the family is even more profound when battering is redefined as an issue
of power and control, rather than physical abuse. Individuals who have
to confront their own feelings of family can distance themselves more
easily when the issue is physical abuse, rather than personal domination.
Thus, the paradox is that redefining battering as an issue of power
and control contradicts the feminist impulse and strategic effort initially
necessary to establish woman-battering as a unique phenomenon justify-
ing special legal recognition. Rather than making battering special, this
redefinition makes battering normal and usual, and places it on a contin-
uum with a range of ordinary, if troubling, aspects of intimate relation-
ships. While this understanding feels more accurate to feminist
theoretical conceptions of battering, it is risky because it heightens the
likelihood of practical problems-denial of and distancing from bat-
tering generally. Once we redefine the experience of battering to one of
power and control, we must confront the complexity and messiness of
pain and love that are characteristic of all intimate relationships. The
particularity that makes battering legally cognizable thus limits the gen-
erality that reflects a more accurate vision of battering relationships.
C. Battering as "Sexism"
Traditionally, feminist work on battering identified battering as a
problem of sexism, of male domination within heterosexual relationships,
shaped by the institution of marriage.78 Battering was viewed as a natu-
ral extension of notions of women as male property within the marital
relationship. Over the last several years, the discovery and exploration of
the problem of lesbian-battering and battering within gay male relation-
ships has redefined this view of battering as unique to heterosexual rela-
tionships.79 Recent exploration of the problem of elder abuse has further
78 See Bograd, supra note 69, at 14.
79 The heterosexist assumption implicit in the term "battered woman" becomes clear when
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expanded feminists' understanding of battering. Finally, several years
ago, studies purportedly showing that men were battered as frequently as
women attracted considerable attention, although these studies have been
discredited. 80 Expanded understandings of abuse have caused feminists
to re-examine the theoretical framework of the battering relationship.
one considers that the term applies equally to a woman who is beaten within a heterosexual
relationship as well as a woman who is in a lesbian relationship.
80 In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of social scientists conducted studies which suppos-
edly demonstrated that women batter men as often or even more frequently than men batter
women, or that deviant behavior on the part of the battered woman provokes the abuse from
her husband or boyfriend. See, e.g., Richard J. Gelles, The Violent Home: A Study of Physi-
cal Aggression Between Husbands and Wives (1972) (theorizing that physical violence be-
tween family members is standard pattern in American families); Mildred D. Pagelow,
Woman-Battering: Victims and Their Experience 20 (1981) (citing several additional studies);
Murray A. Straus et al., Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family 38-41 (1980)
(concluding that statistics on husband-beating are slightly higher than those for wife-beating);
John E. Snell et al., The Wifebeater's Wife, Archives of General Psychiatry, August 1964, at
107-12 (studying role of wives who take battering husbands to court); Diane Steinmetz, The
Battered Husband Syndrome, 2 Victimology 499-509 (1977-78) (examining phenomenon of
husband battering and suggesting reasons why men do not report their victimization and stay
in abusive situations); Murray A. Straus, A General Systems Theory Approach to a Theory of
Violence between Family Members, XII-3 Soc. Sci. Info. 105-25 (1973) (formulating theory
accounting for presence of violence as continuing element in nuclear families).
Many of the social scientists who conducted these studies adhered to family systems the-
ory, which holds that all members of the family system are responsible for dysfunction within
the family, and that therapeutic, not legal, approaches are the most effective in dealing with
family violence. These studies reflect an underlying cultural bias against women who arc
abused by their husbands. Instead of viewing battering as a quest for control on the part of the
abuser, family systems theorists implicitly blame the woman for the abuse by characterizing
the abuse as a breakdown in communication that is at least partially the victim's fault. See
Mahoney, supra note 6, at 47 n.215. Underlying this perception is an assumption that the
family dysfunction is a phenomenon that occurs in a vacuum, apart from societal forces.
Viewing the woman as a victim at best, and a party to her own abuse at worst, discounts
cultural male superiority.
A host of studies by feminist and other theorists indicates that studies conducted by these
social scientists are fundamentally flawed, and that violence within the traditional family is
systematically and overwhelmingly directed against women by men. See S. Schechter, supra
note 37, at 209-16 (criticizing failure of social studies to contextualize battering relationships);
Richard A. Stordeur & Richard Stille, Ending Mens' Violence Against Their Partners: One
Road to Peace 17-36 (1989) (examining theories of wife abuse and developing critical perspec-
tive from which to approach counseling for men who batter); Michele Bograd, Family Systems
Approaches to Wife Battering: A Feminist Critique, 54 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 558-68 (1984)
(critically examining systemic formulations of husband-to-wife violence and discussing contra-
dictions of conjoint therapy with battered women and abusive men); Confronting Domestic
Violence, supra note 20, at 10 (reporting that in New Jersey, wives or girlfriends were victims
in 85% of all domestic violence offenses); Elizabeth Pleck et al., The Battered Data Syndrome:
A Comment on Steinmetz's Article, 2 Victimology 680-83 (1977-1978) (criticizing misinter-
preted findings reported in Steinmetz's discussion of empirical data on battered husbands);
Saunders, supra note 66, at 94-100; Evan Stark & Anne E. Flitcraft, Women and Children at
Risk: A Feminist Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 Int'l J. Health Services 98-100 (1988) (offer-
ing statistical evidence that men are more likely than women to batter their children, especially
men who batter their wives).
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Including a broader range of experiences in which abuse takes place
complicates the traditional heterosexist framework of woman-abuse.
First, this inclusion redefines battering as an issue of power and control
generally, rather than an issue of particular or even exclusive male power
and control. Individual psychological perspectives81 and sociological
perspectives that explicitly focus on "family violence ' 8 2 contrast with
feminist perspectives that focus on male domination. Accordingly, femi-
nist activists and academics have criticized psychological and sociologi-
cal perspectives as inadequate.8 3 Redefinition to include other-battering
81 In general, this work is done by psychodynamic researchers who focus on personality
traits, defense systems, mental disability or illness and psychopathology. See Adams, supra
note 18, at 178-88. Psychodynamic researchers have labeled battered women as "masochistic,
paranoid and depressed," while the same researchers have called batterers "passive-deltndent
and infantile," and lacking in impulse control Another approach in psychology, the interac-
tion model, looks to violence in the families from which batterers and abused women emerge,
as well as to learned social behavior. See Snell et al., supra note 80, at 111.
Feminists have criticized these psychological approaches. First, feminists argue, the psy-
chological focus on pathological behavior suggests that battering is abnormal-a suggestion
which is countered by the overwhelming statistical prevalence of battering. See Confronting
Domestic Violence, supra note 20, at 2-13. Second, psychological explanations have been ap-
plied differentially to men and women: labels and explanations tend to excuse or mitigate the
behavior of the batterer, whereas women are stigmatized. See Adams, supra note 18, at 194;
Ptacek, supra note 18, at 152-53. Third, focusing on the issue as mental illness ignores the
element of systemic power imbalances. Feminists have been less critical of a link to pathology
than to the lack of emphasis on a social and cultural context which is patriarchal. Challenging
the traditional interpretive frameworks used by psychologists, feminists have drawn analogies
between battered women and other victims of terrorism. See S. Schechter, supra note 37, at
210; Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman's Syndrome (1984); Bograd, supra note 80, at
558 (Family Systems approaches to wife battering can introduce subtle biases against women);
Dobash & Dobash, supra note 72, at 65-67; A Feminist Examination of Family Systems Mod-
els of Violence Against Women in the Family, in Women and Family Therapy (Marianne
Ault-Riche ed., 1986).
82 Sociologists study the social structures which lead to wife abuse. Typical studies are
David Finkelhor et al., The Dark Side of Families: Current Family Violence Research (1983);
D. Russell, supra note 74, at 96; The Social Causes of Husband-Wife Violence (Murray Straus
& Gerald T. Hotaling eds., 1980); Murray Straus et al., Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the
American Family (1980). Although sexism within the structure of society is an element of
these sociological theories, the analyses are more "gender neutral" than feminist. Sexism is but
one element of abuse; to the extent that abuse has been attributed to family dysfunction, abuse
is not seen as arising from a male dominated structure.
Feminists respond to sociologists with the same complaint they direct toward psycholo-
gists: that is, the abstraction of violence from its sociohistorical context allows violence to be
viewed as deviant and not commonplace in society. As a result, sociologists foster notions
such as the safety and security of the home. See Elizabeth Stanko, Fear of Crime and the
Myth of the Safe Home: A Feminist Critique of Criminology, in Feminist Perspectives, supra
note 18, at 75. As with the critique of psychology, feminists challenge the methods and models
of study traditionally employed by sociologists.
83 See Bograd, supra note 18, at 11 (defining wife abuse as "use of physical force by a man
against his intimate cohabiting partner"); Wini Breines & Linda Gordon, The New Scholar-
ship on Family Violence, 8 Signs: J. Women in Culture and Soc. 490, 508-16 (1983) (aggregat-
ing problems under rubrics like "family violence" obscures central differences; violence must
be placed in entire social context). See generally R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash,
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relationships is also problematic since it suggests and reinforces an indi-
vidual psychological, "anger-management" perspective on battering, in-
stead of an explicitly feminist perspective. The remainder of this section
describes how the acknowledgment of lesbian, gay male, and elder abuse
affects definitions of battering in theory and in practice.
1. Lesbian and Gay Male Battering
The mainstream domestic violence movement has long operated
from a heterosexist perspective. 84 Ironically, although lesbian activists
were among the first to work with battered women, 85 perception of the
existence of a battering problem within the lesbian community itself
came much later.8 6 Gay men, who have not been widely involved in the
domestic violence movement,8 7 have had even more difficulty acknowl-
edging these problems. As a result, little has been written about lesbian
battering, and even less has been written about gay male battering.88
Several reasons exist that might explain this dearth of theoretical explo-
ration. Understandably, the lesbian and gay male community has been
reluctant to dispel its internal utopian myths by admitting that lesbians
and gay men are sometimes in as much danger at home as they are in a
Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy (1979).
Feminists not only criticize, but also suggest such reformulations of methods of research
as emphasizing women-centered values rather than neutral study; asking why men use force
against their wives rather than why women stay; using qualitative methods of data collection,
especially in early stages (employing the data to assist and not to blame victims); and recogniz-
ing that there is a relational, or collaborative, rather than a traditionally "objective," interac-
tion which exists between the researcher and the respondent. See Bograd, supra note 69, at
20-25.
84 See Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women, Lesbian Battering Intervention Project,
Confronting Lesbian Battering 5 [hereinafter Confronting Lesbian Battering]; Ruthann Rob-
son, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 Golden
Gate U. L. Rev. 567, 584 (1990) ("Domestic violence in feminist legal theory is not necessarily
applicable to lesbian legal theory because feminist legal theory is often based upon heterosexist
assumptions.").
85 See National Coalition Against Domestic Violence Lesbian Task Force, Naming the
Violence: Speaking Out About Lesbian Battering 10 (Kerry Lobel ed. 1986) [hereinafter Nam-
ing the Violence]; see also S. Schechter, supra note 37, at 47.
86 See Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in Nam-
ing the Violence, supra note 85, at 190 (discussing battered and abused lesbians and their fear
and hesitation in acknowledging violence they have suffered).
87 See Confronting Lesbian Battering, supra note 84, at 45 (suggesting that silence of lesbi-
ans and gay men can be partially attributed to society's homophobic attitudes). While lesbian
women became involved in the battered women's cause to aid heterosexual women, gay men
had no similar cause. See S. Schechter, supra note 37, at 56-57.
88 For discussions of these topics, see generally Confronting Lesbian Battering, supra note
84; David Island & Patrick Letellier, Men Who Beat the Men Who Love Them: Battered Gay
Men and Domestic Violence (1991); Naming the Violence, supra note 85; Mahoney, supra
note 6, at 49-53; Robson, supra note 84; Amy Edgington, Anyone But Me, Gay Community
News, July 16, 1989 at 55-58.
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homophobic world.8 9 In addition, the problem of lesbian and gay male
battering disturbingly highlights the capacity for all relationships to de-
scend into violence.90
The traditional model explaining domestic violence as a way of
maintaining patriarchal control within the nuclear family unit is thrown
into question when the violent partner is a woman, or the victim is a
man. Seeing battering as men using violence to control women, or
women and children, within the dominant nuclear family structure fails
to explain satisfactorily the incidence of lesbian and gay male battering,
which appears to occur at rates approximately equal to violence in heter-
osexual relationships.91 Although some legal theorists have attempted to
explain lesbian or gay male battering by comparing the violence to heter-
osexual role-playing,92 lesbian and gay male relationships do not fit
neatly into traditional gender roles. 93 In fact, some have argued that the
characterization of lesbian violence as part of "butch-femnme" dual
roleplay may represent an effort within the lesbian community to avoid
the reality of violence even in "feminist" lesbian relationships. 94 More-
over, rigid gender roles by themselves may not even be able to explain
heterosexual battering. Lenore Walker has suggested that it is when
women attempt to assert power against these roles that the violence
erupts. The attempt to transcend those roles and threaten the superiority
of the more powerful partner, and not the presence of rigid gender roles
in and of themselves, may provide the catalyst for heterosexual
battering.95
The phenomenon of lesbian battering relationships, then, compels
an expansion of the traditional concept of battering to account for this
particular experience. Ruthann Robson, for example, has suggested that
"'dominance' is a hetero-relational concept that may not be applicable to
lesbian relationships . -.96 In seeking to develop a lesbian legal theory
89 See Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: An Examination, in Naming the Violence, supra
note 85, at 194.
90 See Robson, supra note 84, at 591 (observing that violence occurs in all relationships).
91 Incidence of Battering in Lesbian Relationships, LBIP Report, Summer 1991, at 2 (Les-
bian Battering Intervention Project) (citing Jane Garcia, The Cost of Escaping Domestic Vio-
lence, L.A. Times, May 6, 1991, at E2).
92 See, e.g., Robson, supra note 84, at 585 (citing Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Femi-
nist Theory of the State 178 (1989)).
93 See id. at 571-72 (noting that courts fail to make this distinction).
94 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 52-53 (citing Ann Strach et al., Lesbian Abuse: The
Process of the Lesbian Abuse Issues Network (LAIN), in Naming the Violence, supra note 85,
at 88-89 ("Some women initially believed that only 'bar dykes' engaged in violence, that femi-
nist lesbians were not involved in battering relationships and that only couples strictly locked
into butch/femme roles ha[d] a problem with violence.")).
95 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 29 (quoting Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman xi
(1979)).
96 Robson, supra note 84, at 574.
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of battering, she rejects heterosexist formulations embedded in main-
stream feminist legal theories.97 Instead, Robson insists that the legal
community must recognize lesbian relationships and protect battered les-
bians, while realizing that lesbian relationships cannot be neatly analo-
gized to heterosexual relationships. This analogy, instead of protecting
battered lesbians, only serves to victimize them further by obliterating
their distinct sexuality and community.98
A number of theorists seek to resolve the inconsistencies between
the traditional heterosexual paradigm and the realities of lesbian and gay
male battering relationships by focusing on the use of power and control
in all intimate relationships as the root of relational violence in general. 99
The assertion of male power within the historical medium of the hetero-
sexual family is therefore only a single, although the most common, man-
ifestation of the use of violence to control partners in intimate
relationships.
Problems in recognizing and describing lesbian battering may stem
from the many important differences between lesbian and heterosexual
battering relationships. 100 Lesbians are, by and large, excluded from the
legal system;10 1 therefore, issues such as custody, shared property rights
and protection from the batterer must be approached without any as-
sumption that the courts will be available to help a survivor of lesbian
battering. The complexity of feelings that lesbian victims of battering
have toward their batterers is more evident in the first person literature
that does exist.' 0 2 Perhaps lesbians are freer to tell -the complexity of
97 See id. at 585 (arguing that "simplistic equation of lesbian sadomasochism with hetero-
sexual domestic violence does not elucidate the issues involved in intra-lesbian violence").
98 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 50 (discussing how legal system is unresponsive to even
fundamental lesbian legal claims such as marriage and child custody). The prevalence of
homophobia in society and the courts has deterred many lesbians from seeking legal redress,
even in cases involving criminal conduct. In many states, lesbians are unable to pursue types
of relief available to heterosexuals, such as restraining orders. See id.
99 For example, Barbara Hart examines the roots of lesbian relational violence. She attrib-
utes lesbian battering to the violent, patriarchal culture in which we are all socialized. Though
lesbian batterers are not men, they seek the power and control that patiiarchs have historically
enjoyed over family life. Hart asserts that battering lesbians use violence and the threat of
violence because it is an extremely potent way of controlling the family environment. See
Hart, supra note 89, at 173, 174-75; see also Mahoney, supra note 6, at 53-54 (noting interplay
of domination and subordination involved in battering); A Theoretical Model of Lesbian Bat-
tering, in Confronting Lesbian Battering, supra note 84, at 68 (describing behavior used to
coerce, degrade or humiliate).
100 See Confronting Lesbian Battering, supra note 84, at 41 (contrasting lesbian and hetero-
sexual battering); see also Mahoney, supra note 6, at 49-53 (comparing experiences of lesbian
and heterosexual battering victims).
101 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 50 (noting that homophobia often deters battered lesbians
from invoking legal system, and that restraining orders are not available against same-sex part-
ners in some states).
102 See id. at 52.
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their stories.10 3 Another difference is that the batterer is often physically
smaller than the abused partner. Often, theorists and volunteers make
the mistake of assuming that the violence is mutual because both women
claim to have been abused.'0 4 In addition, telephoning a house where
violence often occurs is more dangerous in a lesbian relationship than in
a heterosexual relationship because volunteers cannot assume that the
woman's voice on the line is that of the victim or that the male voice
belongs to the aggressor."' 5
Without expanding our definitions of battering beyond the tradi-
tional heterosexual framework, effective ways of reaching out to and as-
sisting battered lesbians and gay men in the community will be
impossible.10 6 Women working in the shelter movement already worry
about "lesbian baiting."10 7 Lesbians who are battered are sometimes de-
nied shelter outright; at times, they choose not to seek shelter because of
homophobic attitudes that proliferate among shelter workers or other
shelter residents.10 8 Understanding the experiences of lesbian and gay
male abuse is an important first step toward a comprehensive redefinition
of battering relationships.
2. Elder Abuse
Elder abuse has come under public scrutiny as another manifesta-
tion of family violence. As with lesbian and homosexual battering, elder
abuse is not grounded in men beating women, so this problem, too, chal-
lenges the idea that sexism defines battering. The director of a family
shelter in Illinois remarked that "[w]hen everyone began looking at do-
mestic violence, they started with child abuse, then woman abuse. The
third phase is elder abuse."' 9
The literature examining the problem of elder abuse remains lim-
ited, as theoretical models explaining this form of abuse continue to de-
103 See id.
104 See generally Hart, supra note 89, at 180-81 (noting that some lesbian batterers assert
that they are "controlled and victimized" by their partners). Even if both partners abuse each
other repeatedly and a pattern evolves, it is not considered battering "unless the effect of the
violent conduct is to render the perpetrator more powerful and controlling in relation to the
recipient" Id. at 183.
105 See Confronting Lesbian Battering, supra note 84, at 45.
106 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 351 (citing Nancy Hammond, Lesbian Victims and the
Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in Naming the Violence, supra note 85, at 190, 195-96) (discuss-
ing homophobia as factor in lesbian victims' reluctance to seek help, and in many lesbian
shelter workers' reluctance openly to offer services geared toward lesbian community).
107 See Confronting Lesbian Battering, supra note 84, at 3, 10.
108 See Janice Irvine, Lesbian Battering: The Search for Shelter, Gay Community News,
Jan. 14, 1984, at 25 (discussing escalation of homophobia in shelter movement).
109 Suzanne McNamara, Elderly Abuse, Chi. Trib., May 19, 1991, at 3.
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velop.110 As with woman-abuse, studies are complicated by the fact that
elder abuse is vastly underreported. A recent House of Representatives
Committee on Aging Report estimated that five percent of the elderly
population experiences abuse, but only I in 8 cases are reported.III In
one survey, only fourteen percent of the reports of abuse were made by
the elderly person-an indication both of the reluctance to implicate
family members, who in the majority of the cases of elder abuse are the
perpetrators, and also of the social isolation of the elderly.1 12
One of the major issues in the literature examining elder abuse has
been defining the term "abuse." Unlike the tendency in examinations of
woman battering to limit consideration to purely physical violence, mod-
els of elder abuse almost always adopt a continuum which includes phys-
ical, psychological, and financial abuse.113 Abuse of the elderly thus
ranges from the extremely violent cases of beating and murder reported
in the news, to the more commonplace occurrences of threatening behav-
ior, confining the elderly to a chair or a room, depriving the person of
care, or forcing medicine or food on the person.1 14
110 Researchers have developed a number of models to explain elder abuse. The "situa-
tional model," with its focus on situational stress and structural factors as aggravating forces
which increase the likelihood of abuse directed at the person associated with the stress, has
many adherents. See generally Linda R. Phillips, Theoretical Explanations of Elder Abuse:
Competing Hypotheses and Unresolved Issues, in Elder Abuse: Conflict in the Family 197,
198-202 (Karl A. Pillemer & Rosalie S. Wolf eds., 1986) (discussing situational model and
noting its wide acceptance). Researchers have borrowed heavily from already existing knowl-
edge about other forms of family violence without considering the ways in which the particular
dynamic between the elder and the caregiver, who are often parent and child, may cause differ-
ences. See id. at 202.
Another conceptual model, termed social exchange theory, looks at power imbalances in
social exchange that facilitate abuse relationships. See id. at 202-07. Although the critical
element in such an examination would seem to be the abused elder, at least one study has
shown that the relevant factor was not the dependence of the elder, but rather the dependence
of the abuser caregiver. Abuse can be viewed then, as an expression of "when the abuser feels
powerless and impotent and seeks to compensate for the lack of control or power loss with the
resources available." Id. at 205. Other researchers have noted the importance of behavior
practiced within the particular family and the impact that negative attitudes toward the elderly
may exert upon tendencies toward abuse. See Abuse of the Elderly: Issues and Annotated
Bibliography 18-19 (Benjamin Schlesinger & Rachel Schlesinger eds., 1988).
111 See Audrey S. Garfield, Elder Abuse and the States' Adult Protective Services Response:
Time for a Change in California, 42 Hastings L.J. 61, 61 (1991) (citing Elder Abuse: A Dec-
ade of Shame and Inaction, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of
the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990)).
112 As one social worker commented, "[o]ften the abusing child may be the only access that
the elderly person has to the outside world." McNamara, supra note 109, at 3.
113 See Terry T. Fulmer & Terrence A. O'Malley, Inadequate Care of the Elderly: A
Health Care Perspective on Abuse and Neglect 18-19 (1987) (summarizing six studies and how
they define abuse).
114 The author of one study examined the interactions between the elderly and the caregiver
and concluded that the behavior engaged in by both parties reflected a struggle over control.
See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, Duty-Bound: Elder Abuse and Family Care 18 (1988). The author
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Elder abuse, like all intrafamily violence, is a complex phenomenon
which results from the interaction of many factors. It often develops
around a relationship where the elderly person is bound to the caregiver
by physical dependency, and the caregiver is emotionally and financially
dependent on the aged person. 1 5 The abuse that occurs in these situa-
tions is closely related to the internal stress endemic to such family rela-
tionships. Elder abuse bears particular resemblance to woman-abuse,
because both involve a long-term intimate relationship between two
adults. In addition, elder abuse sometimes is the continuation of woman-
abuse.116 Studies report that the majority of the victims of elder abuse
are women."17
Examining lesbian and gay male battering and elder abuse shows
that the themes of power and control extend beyond heterosexual rela-
tionships, in particular, to intimate relationships in general. It is critical
that feminist activists and academics continue to affirm the particular
experience of woman-abuse, shaped by understandings of male domina-
tion in heterosexual relationships, while including in our understanding
of abuse the ways in which power and control operate in all intimate
noted that caregivers engaged in controlling and abusive behavior, which ranged from ignoring
the elder to psychological and physical abuse. See id. However, she also observed that elders
engaged in verbal abuse, crying, pouting, refusing food or medicine, and physical abuse di-
rected at the caregiver. See id. Interestingly, a considerable proportion of the elderly partici-
pants engaged in physical violence which in some cases may have reflected a life-long cycle of
violence between parent and child. See id. at 187-88. Steinmetz observed a correlation be-
tween the use of physical violence by elders and their dependency on the caregiver; those
elderly who used violence were more likely to require significantly more health, financial, and
social assistance. See id. at 188. Caregivers engaging in psychologically abusive behavior were
more likely to have cared for the elder for longer and to have held more responsibility for
performing essential tasks. See id. at 194.
Although Steinmetz advises that this trend needs to be examined on larger, representative
samples, since not all her findings were statistically significant, her work supports the proposi-
tion that abuse can be viewed as the range of "positive and negative methods [used to] attempt
to gain or maintain control." Id. at 199. While Steinmetz's study comes uncomfortably close
to suggesting that both the elder and the abusing caregiver are victims, the work is important
for its recognition of the complex web of dependency and resentment which binds the aged
person and the caregiver together and which reveals itself in a range of abusive behavior.
115 See Help for the Terrified Elderly, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1991, at A18 (editorializing as to
how abused and abuser are bonded by money, emotional co-dependency, and guilt).
116 See Phillips, supra note 110, at 199; Diane Brady, A Hidden Terror. Abuse of the Eld-
erly is Increasing, MacLean's, Aug. 19, 1991, at 36 (stating that for many victims elder abuse
is simply continuation of marital abuse).
117 See Jordan . Kosberg, Preventing Elder Abuse: Identification of High Risk Factors
Prior to Placement Decisions, 28 Gerontologist 43, 45 (1988) (suggesting that women are more
likely to be abused in part because there are more older women than men and because they are
less likely to resist); see also Mary Joy Quinn & Swan K. Tomita, Elder Abuse and Neglect:
Causes, Diagnosis and Intervention Strategies 28-31 (1986) (citing two studies in which at least
80% of elders abused were women). But see Karl Pillemer & David Finkelhor, The Preva-
lence of Elder Abuse: A Random Sample Survey, 28 Gerontologist 51, 55 (1988) (finding
roughly equal percentages of abuse of elderly men and women).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 1992]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
relationships. The situations of lesbian-abuse, abuse between gay men,
and elder abuse provide us with opportunities to deepen our theoretical
understanding and broaden our practical experience with the problem of
abuse.
The term "battered woman" suggests that the experiences of all bat-
tered women are the same. Yet, there is no single "battered woman";
many battered women of color and battered women's advocates of color
have begun to write and talk about their experiences; 11 lesbian-battering
has come to the fore. There may be significant differences in the ways in
which abuse occurs and is experienced based on the sex of the parties, as
well as race, class, age, and many other factors. However, as we under-
stand violence in "particular" situations, we also uncover more "general"
themes. We need not deny the particular urgency of the feminist critique
in order to recognize a broader range of situations in which battering
occurs. It is this recognition of both particularity and generality which
must reshape our theoretical framework.
II
NEW DILEMMAS POSED BY THE CONTINUING TENSION
BETWEEN VICTIMIZATION AND AGENCY
In earlier work, I have identified tension between the false dichoto-
mies of victimization and agency as a major theme in work on woman-
abuse. In this Part of the Article, I explore new dilemmas in work on
woman-abuse that manifest the continuing tension between victimization
and agency as examples of the larger problem of particularity and
generality.
Historically, neither the public nor scholars had a category for, or
social and legal definition of, battered women. Recently, historians such
as Linda Gordon have helped to unearth the history of battered women.
Gordon details the experiences of battered women who, through interac-
tions with social workers in the early twentieth century, began to define
an affirmative entitlement not to be hit.' 19 Nonetheless, the predominant
view, which continues to the present, sees battered women as alien, as
horrible.' 20 The alternative image of the battered woman as victim, de-
veloped by the battered women's movement itself, created new problems
as well. We now alternate between visions of the battered woman as
118 See notes 42-60 and accompanying text supra; note 185 and accompanying text infra.
119 See generally Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of
Family Violence (1989) (explaining family violence in light of history of power relationships
both within and outside to the family).
120 See id. at 279-81, 286 (detailing instances where battered women rather than their assail-
ants were seen as outcasts).
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agent-as cause or provocateur of the battering-and the battered
woman as helpless victim. And we go back and forth between these two
images without any real public engagement on the problems underlying
battering. However, portraying women solely as victims or solely as
agents is neither accurate nor adequate to explain the complex realities of
women's lives.
As I suggested in my earlier article, Describing and Changing, vic-
timization has become an increasingly powerful and pervasive theme in
the women's movement and in feminist legal theory.' 21 Because women
often are victims, this perspective on women's experience can be impor-
tant and useful, particularly on issues concerning violence against
women. Several years ago, Susan Schechter emphasized the dangers of
an analysis of battered women premised on victimization, rather than
oppression. She suggested that the characterization of battered women
as victims has been viewed as posing a complicated political problem for
the battered women's movement:
[T]he focus on victimization helps to blur the insight that the struggle
for battered women's rights is linked to the more general fight for
women's liberation. When activists view battering as victimization
rather than as an aspect of oppression they have a tendency to see
individual problems rather than collective ones.122
In addition, she observed that "victim" may be a label that battered
women reject because "it fails to capture their complexity and
strength." 123 At the same time, the notion of women's agency is equally
limited without a social context of victimization. Agency carries with it
assumptions of liberal visions of autonomy, individual action, individual
control, and mobility that are also inadequate and incomplete.
Victimization and agency are false dichotomies; both fail to take ac-
count of women's daily experiences of oppression, struggle, and resist-
ance within ongoing relationships. Explanation of battered women's
experiences that documents this complex and multi-faceted process is
crucial and precisely what I have expressed by the phrase "describe, but
allow for change." 124 Our task as feminist legal theorists must be to give
121 See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 201-04 (suggesting that admis-
sion of expert testimony helps portray battered woman as victim).
122 Susan Schechter, supra note 37, at 252.
123 Id. Significantly, Kristin Bumiller has documented similar reluctance on the part or
individuals to identify as victims in the context of employment discrimination. See Kristin
Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims 88-93 (1988) (review-
ing several case studies in which victims of discrimination sought a more positive formulation
of their situation).
124 Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 222; see also Mahoney, supra note
6 (exploration of issues of oppression, struggle, and resistance); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit:
Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L
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voice to, describe and name legal problems for women--describing them
in detail and in context, and translating them to legal and public arenas
of change. We must do this in a way that is not only accurate to the
realities of women's experience but that also takes into account the com-
plexity of these experiences and allows for change.
In recent years, the battered women's movement has begun to grap-
ple with this victim/agent dichotomy. For example, one now sees the
term "battered woman survivor" used frequently to replace the term
"battered woman"; along with this rhetorical change comes a developing
literature concerning "battered woman survivors."1 25 Many resource
materials on battered women now emphasize the enormous human
strengths and capacities of battered women, who struggle to survive, pro-
tect themselves, and keep their families functioning.126 Yet because the
definition of who a battered woman is remains narrow, battered women
continue to suffer from being described as victims and irrational agents.
This Part explores in detail three manifestations of the victim/agent
dichotomy as examples of the larger tension between particularity and
generality. Section A examines the problems that women with children
face when they are battered. The law views battered mothers as primar-
ily responsible for harms to which their children are exposed. Yet, in
custody battles, battered women may lose custody of their children be-
cause they are portrayed as victims. Thus, work on woman-abuse must
recognize the particular problem for battered women shaped by the more
general context of motherhood. Section B examines why women who
have been battered are required to leave these relationships in order to
gain the protection of the law and looks at the particular experiences of
woman-abuse in the more general context of unequal, complex and con-
strained relationships between women and men. Finally, Section C turns
to new examples of public resistance to the notion that women who have
been battered may be "reasonable." Here the particular problems that
women who have been battered face must be understood in the more
general context of deep social stereotypes concerning women's reasona-
bleness. These three situations highlight the need to adapt our theory to
new developments in practice, and the difficulty in integrating theoretical
complexity into practice.
A. Mothers Who Are Battered
Recent scholarship and activism have begun to focus on the
Rev. 1283 (1992) (same).
125 See, e.g., Edward W. Gondolf & Ellen R. Fisher, Battered Women as Survivors: An
Alternative to Treating Learned Helplessness (1988); L. Hoff, supra note 21.
126 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 6, at 40.
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problems that women who are battered face when they are mothers. 127
Recent studies have suggested that there is a high correlation between
male battering of women and child abuse.128 This phenomenon com-
pounds the harm from which battered women suffer, for where a child is
beaten by her father or even just exposed to violence, the mother is likely
to be held responsible for any harm that the child suffers.1 29 The Lisa
Steinberg case, recent legislative reform efforts to hold responsible
mothers who are battered, and problems that battered women may face
with custody dramatize these tensions.
The first example is the situation posed by the Lisa Steinberg case
which attracted such attention in New York, perhaps because "we are
fascinated by that which we recognize."1 30 During Joel Steinberg's trial
for the murder of his adopted daughter, Lisa, considerable controversy
arose among feminists concerning whether Hedda Nussbaum should
share responsibility for Lisa's death. In particular, Susan Brownmiller
and others charged that despite Hedda Nussbaum's experiences as a se-
verely battered woman, she should not have been treated as a victim and
absolved of all liability.1 31 Instead, she, along with Joel, should have
been prosecuted. For feminists to identify with Hedda Nussbaum was
127 See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domes-
tic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1041 (1991) (discussing failure of
courts to consider domestic violence in custody decisions).
128 See Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using our Knowledge of
Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, IA Current Perspectives
in Psychological, Legal and Ethical Issues, 197, 200 (1991) (noting one study finding that in
over half of the cases the woman-batterer also battered the children and another study where
45% of children investigated for abuse or neglect had mothers who were battered). The rela-
tionship between violence directed at women and violence directed at children within the fam-
ily setting is described in Richard J. Gelles, 8 The Myth of Battered Husbands and New Facts
About Family Violence 65-72 (1979). See also Jean G. Moore, Yo-Yo Children: Victims of
Matrimonial Violence, 54 Child Welfare 558-61 (1975) (describing effect of pattern of violence
on children); Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Child Abuse and the Battering of Women: Are
They Related and How?, paper presented at the National Family Violence Conference, Dur-
ham, N.H. (1984); Straus et a., supra note 80, at 115 (asserting that "violent husbands and
wives are also likely to be child abusing parents").
129 See John Davidson, It's Always the Mother, Mirabella, May 1991, at 167 (discussing
tendency to hold women accountable when men in their lives beat or kill their children); Geor-
gia Network Against Domestic Violence, Abused Mothers of Abused Children: A Perspective,
in Network News, Jan. 1990, at 1 (recognizing expansion of sanctions to non-abusing parent as
response to public outcry against child abuse); Suzanne Groisser, Battered Women & Their
Battered Children: Criminal and Civil Allegations of the Woman's Failure to Protect 3 (May
14, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting
that more women than men are charged with failure to protect).
130 Sam Ehrlich, Lisa, Hedda and Joel: The Steinberg Murder Case 7 (1989) (quoting Glo-
ria Steinem).
131 See Susan Brownmiller, Hedda Nussbaum: Hardly a Heroine, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1989, at A25.
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"simplistic and alarming," Brownmiller charged.1 32 She wrote in The
New York Times:
Systematic battering combined with misguided, though culturally in-
culcated, notions of love is not a sufficient excuse to exonerate Hedda
Nussbaum from her share of culpability in Lisa Steinberg's death....
When decent, honorable women insist that a piece of Hedda Nuss-
baum resides in us all, they give the Joel Steinbergs of this world far
too much credit and far too much power. More insidiously, they per-
petuate the specious notion that women are doomed to be victims of
the abnormal psychology of love at all cost.133
The Steinberg case is one illustration of the link between woman
abuse and child abuse that is now being brought to public attention.
These situations raise critical questions as to whether the abused woman
has any legal responsibility and should therefore face criminal or civil
charges of failure to protect, child abuse, or child neglect. Many battered
women's advocates were outraged by Brownmiller's reactions to Hedda
Nussbaum. Organizing letter-writing campaigns and public statements
in response, battered women's groups suggested that Brownmiller was
falling into the historic role of "blaming the victim." ' 34
In this circumstance, the "victim" description seems most accurate
to the battered woman's experience: the woman is trapped by a man who
is abusing both her and her children. Yet, the woman's role as mother
makes characterizing her as victim far more problematic. We expect
mothers to transcend their victimization, to act on behalf of their chil-
dren regardless of their own situations. 135 A host of recent legislation
charging battered women with criminal liability for failure to protect
children, or for abuse or neglect, reflects this view.136'
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See Minow, supra note 22, at 1681.
135 The issue of a battered mother's failure to protect has arisen recently in the public eye
not only in the Lisa Steinberg case but in other cases as well. Robbi Boutwell, in Houston,
Texas, pled guilty to manslaughter for the death of her son. See Groisser, supra note 129, at 30
(citing Barbara Whitaker, Finding Levels of Victimization: Nussbaum, Cortez Abuse Cases
Viewed Differently, Newsday, Jan. 8, 1989). Boutwell never struck her child, and she was
beaten and had her life threatened when she told her batterer, Chris Zuliani, not to bother the
child. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 167. Similarly, Abigail Cortez, a battered woman, was
indicted for second-degree murder, second-degree manslaughter, and endangering the welfare
of a child, in the same year and city as Hedda Nussbaum. See Whitaker, supra, at 30; see also
Coalition of Battered Women's Advocates, Position Paper on Child Welfare 467, Nov. 1988
[hereinafter Position Paper] ("It has been our experience that far too few child abusers are
actually prosecuted and convicted by the courts while too many battered women face child
neglect charges.").
136 See Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 Law & Ineq.
J. 359, 366-67 (1987) (listing relevant statutes); Groisser, supra note 129, at 26-29 (discussing
criminal statutes and statutory defenses to crime of failure to protect).
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Recently, battered mothers whose children are abused by their bat-
terers have been prosecuted for child abuse or neglect, and even for man-
slaughter, on the theory that they have failed to protect the child from
the batterer.13 7 Recent legislative efforts to criminalize parental inaction
have blurred the distinction between child neglect and child abuse:
thirty-five of the forty-eight states criminalizing child abuse include
omissions as well as commissions in their definitions of the statutory of-
fense, and eight states expressly define the crime of failure to protect. 38
In Mississippi, for example, a person may be found guilty of child abuse
who "omits the performance of any duty." 139 Most of the statutes frame
the crime in terms of criminal child endangerment. A Hawaii statute, for
example, provides that, "A person commits the offense of endangering
the welfare of a minor... by violating or interfering with any legal duty
of care or protection owed to a minor."1'4' Similarly, in Maine, endan-
gering the welfare of a child includes knowingly endangering "the child's
health, safety or mental welfare by violating a duty of care or protec-
tion,"1 41 and in Montana a person may be found guilty of child endan-
germent for "violating a duty of care, protection or support." 142
A survey of reported cases reveals the same pattern of battered
women who are prosecuted for child abuse where their batterer is the
abuser of the child. 143 Statutory affirmative defenses for battered women
137 See note 135 supra.
138 Those states which do not criminalize omissions are Alabama, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Johnson, supra note 136, at 366.
139 Id. at 366 n.51 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39 (Supp. 1986)).
140 Id. (citing Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-904 (1985)).
141 Id. (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 554 (West 1983)).
142 Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-662 (1986)); see also id. (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 639:3 (1986) (crime of endangering welfare of child is "purposely violating a duty of care,
protection, or support"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.22 (Anderson Supp. 1987) (endanger-
ing welfare of child includes, "violating a duty of care, protection or support"); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 4304 (1983) (same); Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-403 (Supp. 1987) (person commits crime of
endangerment by "violating a duty of care, protection or support")).
See generally Groisser, supra note 129, at 3 (noting irony that, while parental culpability
has been expanded effectively to include maternal victims of violent abuse, responsibility of
state child service agencies has been constricted by United States Supreme Court's decision in
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
143 See Phelps v. State, 439 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming conviction for child
abuse where battered mother failed to prevent death of son at hands of child's stepfather);
State v. Williams, 670 P.2d 122 (N.M. App. Ct. 1983) (convicting battered wife of child abuse
for failure to prevent beating of daughter); Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311 (Pa.
Super. 1986) (finding battered woman's failure to take adequate steps to prevent abuse of her
child violative of duty of care); Commonwealth v. Howard, 402 A.2d 674 (Pa. Super. 1979)
(affirming conviction for involuntary manslaughter where battered mother failed to prevent
death of daughter at hands of mother's boyfriend); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wise.
1986) (holding abuse statute applicable to parent who knowingly permits another person to
abuse parent's own child); see also Erickson, supra note 128, at 197.
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accused of child abuse exist in a number of states. 144 These statutes al-
low a woman to escape liability by explaining that she feared any action
taken to stop the abuse would cause physical harm to her or cause more
danger for the child.145
There are many cases involving battered women with children who
are abused that are just being uncovered. In many reported cases involv-
ing abuse or neglect, opinions do not even mention the fact that a woman
has been battered,1 46 so that it is difficult to come up with an exhaustive
list of cases involving battered women, despite available statistical
evidence that batterers are more likely to abuse children in the
household.' 47
Courts may not know that a woman is battered, or consider that fact
to be relevant in deciding whether to find her culpable for failure to pro-
tect. But battering also can work against battered women. In a New
Mexico case, for example, the appellate court upheld a child abuse con-
viction of a woman who was severely battered and pregnant for failing to
protect her child from her husband's violence.148 The court reasoned
that the woman's experience of battering supported her conviction be-
cause the battering evidenced her awareness of the dangerousness of her
husband.1 49 Similarly, in Phelps v. State,150 Gayle Weaver Phelps was
charged with child abuse when her husband killed her toddler son by
striking him in the abdomen. The court held that because Ms. Phelps
knew of her husband's violence-because her husband beat her-she
should have prevented the child's death and, therefore, was liable for the
abuse. 151
144 See Johnson, supra note 136, at 367 n.54 (citing Iowa Code Ann. § 726.6.1.c (West
Supp. 1986); Minn. Stat. § 609.378 (1984); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 852.1.a (Supp. 1990)).
145 See Groisser, supra note 129, at 28 (discussing statutory defenses to crime of failure to
protect); see also Erickson, supra note 128, at 207-10 (discussing inability to prevent harm and
increased risk to child).
146 See Erickson, supra note 128, at 200 & 214 n.26 (noting lack of defenses in New York
and California cases concerning failure to act to prevent child abuse); Groisser, supra note 129,
at 59 ("There are very few recorded civil appellate cases nationwide that identify the mother as
a battered woman.").
147 See Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 80, at 98-100 (offering statistical evidence that men are
more likely than women to batter their children, especially men who batter their wives). See
generally Position Paper, supra note 135, at 467 ("It has been our experience that far too few
child abusers are actually prosecuted and convicted by the courts; while too many battered
women face child neglect charges.").
148 See State v. Williams, 670 P.2d 122 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
149 See id. at 124 (discussing defendant's knowledge of husband's drug use and violent
nature).
150 439 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
151 See Groisser, supra note 129, at 40. For other cases in which battered women are con-
victed of child abuse for failure to act, see Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 211 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) (battered woman convicted of endangering her child for "knowingly" failing
to act to protect child); Commonwealth v. Howard, 402 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)
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What are the appropriate boundaries of responsibility for a mother
who is battered? We are just beginning to explore the implications of
motherhood for feminist legal theory and practice generally.15 2 Many
battered women report that they were only able to mobilize to change
their lives when their children began to be abused.1 53 Responsibility for
children does heighten the need for safety, but we do not want to place
that responsibility exclusively on the mother. It is difficult to determine
the contours of maternal responsibility in a culture that blames mothers
for all problems relating to children and absolves fathers of all responsi-
bility. Mothers who are abused face enormous pressures to protect them-
selves and their children and to maintain their families even under
terrible and constrained circumstances. These situations pose enormous
conflicts-conflicts that cannot be honestly confronted unless we move
beyond the dichotomous characterizations of victim and agent. "good"
mother versus "bad" mother. We must struggle to understand the com-
plicated daily pressures that operate on battered women With children
and make these pressures visible.
The tension between victimization and agency emerges in another
context involving battered women and their children-child custody.
Although custody has always been an important issue for battered
women due to their fear of losing their children, it has become increas-
ingly urgent since many battering men fight the issuance of restraining
orders by initiating divorce and custody proceedings against battered
women.154 Battered women have good reasons to take this threat
seriously.
Recent scholarship has suggested that women who depart from
(upholding mother's conviction for voluntary manslaughter where she failed to protect her
child from battering by mother's boyfriend); Groisser, supra note 129, at 42-45 & n.122 (citing
State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 149-50 (Wis. 1986) (judicially expanding legislative
enactment which did not expressly include omissions to hold Terri Williquette liable for child
abuse for failure to protect her children).
152 See generally Marie Ashe and Naomi Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist The-
ory, 2 Tex. J. Women and L. (forthcoming 1993) (arguing that feminist theory needs to ad-
dress role of "bad mothers" in child abuse); Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty
Discourses, 2 Duke LJ. 274 (1991) (discussing concept of motherhood as it relates to tradi-
tional theories of poverty and family); Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. Miami
L. Rev. 653 (1992) (discussing evolution of symbolic aspects of "Mother" in modern family
law reform and arguing for further reforms); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Power of Women. 2
Yale J.L. & Feminism 435 (1990) (reviewing Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist The-
ory of the State).
153 See Lee Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in
Feminist Perspectives, supra note 18, at 164; Snell et al., supra note 80, at 108.
154 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 44 n.198 (citing example of woman who allowed her
temporary restraining order to expire because her husband offered to drop threat of custody
suit); see also Finn & Colson, supra note 20, at I (noting that initiation ofcriminal proceedings
may expose victim to immediate risk of further violence).
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traditional stereotypes of "perfect" mothers, including those who are sex-
ually active, lesbian, or battered, are penalized in custody decisions. 155
In battering contexts, a double standard exists as to fitness of fathers or
mothers. If a father seeks custody at all, a judge will often take the at-
tempt at custody as prima facie evidence of paternal fitness. In these
cases, violence against the women is held not to be of importance.1 56 In
some extreme cases, even the murder of the mother by the father has
been held to be irrelevant for purposes of determining parental fitness.15 7
Incredibly, though battering fathers are usually not penalized be-
cause of their attacks, battered mothers often are. The standard stereo-
type of battered women as helpless victims works against women in the
context of a custody proceeding.158 This stereotype blames women for
not leaving, instead of the men for perpetuating the abuse; it also charac-
terizes "batteredness" as somehow deviant, abnormal, extremely differ-
ent from what all women experience.159
Cultural images of battered women as helpless have only exacer-
bated the problem in the custody arena. The "dysfunctional portrait of
battered women" 16° that has emerged in cases involving battered women
on trial for the killing of their assailant, has created a legal stereotype.
When a battered woman decides to identify her abuse in the context of a
custody suit, courtroom professionals, many of them trained in family
systems theory, may shunt that woman into a stereotypical category, one
that characterizes her as weak, passive, victimized, and therefore unable
155 For problems that women face in custody disputes generally, see Phyllis Chesler,
Mothers on Trial: The Battle for Children and Custody (1986). For discussion of custody
problems faced by women who are sexually active, see Maryland Special Joint Committee on
Gender Bias in the Courts, Gender Bias in the Courts 35-37 (1989); Report of the New York
Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 105-07 (1986-1987). For
discussion of how lesbian relationships adversely affect the women's attempt to gain custody of
their children, see Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Fam-
ilies, 78 Geo. L.J. 459, 464-68 (1990). For problems battered women face in custody proceed-
ings, see Cahn, supra note 127.
156 See Glasbrenner v. Sapio, No. A-4263-88T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Feb. 6, 1990),
cert. denied, 584 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1990); Mahoney, supra note 6, at 45.
157 See In re H.L.T., 298 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (ignoring manslaughter of wife by
husband in making custody determination); In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(murderer of mother of children awarded custody based on "best interests of the child" stan-
dard); Bartasavich v. Mitchell, 471 A.2d 833 (Pa. Super 1984) (father murdered mother and
abused child but still received custody on appeal). But see In re Abdullah, 423 N.W.2d 915
(Ill. 1981) (finding premeditated murder of child's mother prima facie evidence of father's
depravity); Viola v. Randolph W., 356 S.E.2d 464, 470 (W. Va. 1987) (stating that "first degree
murder of child's parent is the ultimate act of savagery to that child.. we can conceive of few
circumstances in which the termination of parental rights would be more justified").
158 See Cahn, supra note 127, at 1055-78; Mahoney, supra note 6, at 345-46.
159 See Cahn, supra note 127, at 8 (citing Littleton, supra note 39, at 37-38).
160 Mahoney, supra note 6, at 46.
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to properly care for her children.
However, battered women (and women in general) are put in a
double bind. A woman who is strong, capable, and assertive, is bucking
the common stereotype of the battered woman. For example, women
have lost custody of their children because of their "propensity for vio-
lence"-what in actuality was an aggressive show of self-defense, where a
mother allegedly fired a rifle at her ex-husband when he came to visit the
child. 1 61 A mother's act of self-defense is more likely to be understood as
violent than a father's battering, so that the mother will lose custody. 162
Stories of women losing custody because of their battering exper-
iences abound. Christine Littleton relates a story in which a woman who
had gotten a temporary restraining order against her husband was at-
tacked by him in her bedroom. She fled his attack, and the husband got
custody because he claimed, and the judge believed, that the woman had
abandoned her children that night.163 Other researchers relate a case in
which a woman ran away from home because her husband was chasing
her with a shotgun. The woman decided to leave the children in the
house as she fled into the woods since her husband had never harmed
them before, and because she was in imminent danger of losing her own
life. The judge granted custody to the batterer, since he was angry at the
woman for leaving her children behind. 164
These circumstances of battered women with children, issues of bat-
tered women's responsibility for children and custody, underscore the
need to move beyond the dichotomy of victimization and agency. These
new developments underscore ways in which the traditional framework
of victimization must be disrupted. They underscore the need to describe
all the dimensions of battered women's experience without falling into
the extremes of either victimization or agency. They also demonstrate
the degree to which the particular issues which battered women face as
mothers must be understood in the context of the general problems that
women face in motherhood under constrained circumstances.
B. Requiring Battered Women to Leave
The immediate question for most people when they first hear about
the problems of battered women is "why don't they leave?" This ques-
tion reflects a tendency to want battered women to take control, to act as
161 See Collins v. Collins, 297 S.E.2d 901, 902 (W. Va. 1982).
162 See Cahn, supra note 127, at 1058 n.74 (discussing Collins).
163 See Littleton, supra note 39, at 54.
164 See Cahl, supra note 127, at 1091 (citing Lenore E. Walker & Glenace E. EdwaU, Do-
mestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and Custody in Divorce, in Domestic Vio-
lence on Trial: Psychological and Legal Dimensions of Family Violence 131 (Daniel J. Sonkin
ed., 1987).
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agents and reject completely their victimization. However, many bat-
tered women cannot leave. They have no money, no child care, no em-
ployment; they are financially and emotionally dependent on the men
who batter them; they think that it is better to stay with the men because
of children; or they don't want to leave, because they love the men and
want to maintain whatever intimacy and sense of connection they can.
Many battered women report that they want the relationship to continue
but the battering to stop. 165
Moreover, leaving provides battered women no assurance of separa-
tion or safety. The stories of battered women who have been hunted
down across state lines and harassed or killed are legion.' 66 Indeed,
much abuse can be viewed as what Martha Mahoney has called "separa-
tion attack," beatings that are provoked by the woman's threat of, or
actual, separation from the man.167
Many commentators have noted the troubling result of the focus on
why the woman does not leave.1 68 Asking this question places responsi-
bility on the woman, and puts her conduct under scrutiny, rather than
placing the responsibility on the battering man.' 69 Instead of asking
"why doesn't the woman leave," we should ask "why do men batter," or
perhaps, more significantly, "why does society tolerate men who batter?"
It also assumes a false black-and-white model of human relationship, of
simple right and wrong, penalizing the woman for seeking to maintain
connection. Surely the contradiction and compromise involved in inti-
mate relationships are not outside each of our own experience.
Where each of us will draw the line depends heavily on context, the
nature of our human, economic, and social dependence, the existence of
and relationship with children, social supports and the degree to which
we perceive that there are realistic options. As described in Part I, bat-
tering results from abuse of power and control within intimate relation-
ships; asking why battered women stay, rather than what makes batterers
abuse, distances us from examining this complexity. The particularity of
battered women's experience must be understood in the context of the
165 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 64 (citing Angela Browne, When Battered Women Kill
(1987)).
166 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (involving abusive husband who
followed wife from Kansas to Oklahoma and threatened to kill her if she ever ran away from
him again). For further discussion of this case, see Mahoney, supra note 6, at 85-87.
167 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 65-68.
168 See, e.g., Littleton, supra note 39, at 37-38 (analyzing consequences of focusing on
woman's failure to leave rather than man's violence). See generally Mahoney, supra note 6, at
61-65 (stating that the question "why did the woman fail to leave" is in fact assertive statement
that woman did not leave, thereby diminishing any actual separations or attempts by woman
to separate from her batterer).
169 See Mahoney, supra note 6, at 61.
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generality of inequality, power imbalance, and compromise in intimate
relationships.
There is some sense in which people assume superhuman dimen-
sions and become the focus of unrealistic expectations when they become
victims, "battered women," claim sexual harassment, or claim discrimi-
nation generally. Because one is claiming to be harmed, to be in need of
special protection, one's life and conduct become entirely open to scru-
tiny. Think of Anita Hill. Others who are observing and judging the
situation are comparing themselves to this projected image. Requiring a
battered woman to leave is a projection of a higher standard of conduct.
It reflects a process of distancing oneself and one's behavior, of saying
"this is not me." If instead we were able to acknowledge generality, the
human connection, see what was similar with that woman's situation and
our own experience, to understand genuinely the commonality of sexual
subordination and the complexity and compromise involved in all inti-
mate relationships, we could understand why a woman who had a rela-
tionship with a battering man might choose to remain and struggle but
still want the battering to stop. We might be more accepting of the com-
plex circumstances in which women who are battered find themselves,
and therefore better able to devise strategies that would help.
C. Resistance to Reasonableness
One critical insight of women's self-defense work was the idea that
there was deep gender-bias in the concept of "reasonableness."' 7 0 Be-
cause self-defense is premised on the idea of reasonableness, this insight
was central to the dilemma posed by self-defense claims made by women.
Early work on women's self-defense argued that reasonableness was a
gendered concept because only men were viewed as reasonable-women
were viewed as inherently unreasonable-and that work suggested that
these views had long been part of the common law.17' Consequently
women become less likely to be able to plead self-defense successfully and
170 My earlier Articles suggest a variety of reasons for this result, including: sex-stereotypi-
cal attitudes that men are reasonable and women are unreasonable/hysterical/emotional; intu-
itive, patriarchal attitudes held by judges and jurors that battered women are inherently crazy
for taking abuse and staying in relationships; and stereotypes of women as particularly vicious
and threatening for killing men with whom they are intimate. See Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex-Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L
Rev. 623, 624-30 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial]; Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to
Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 149, 151-53 (1978).
171 See Maguigan, supra note 6, at 409-13 (discussing impact of reasonableness standard on
self-defense instruction to jury); Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 198;
Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial, supra note 170, at 635-36.
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have been relegated to pleas of temporary insanity or manslaughter. 172
Recently, feminist scholars have examined the problems of reasonable-
ness in other contexts. 73
The overwhelming number of cases in which courts addressed issues
of women's self-defense involved battered women charged with killing
men who battered them.174 The primary legal issue relating to sex bias in
the law of self-defense has been the issue of admissibility of expert testi-
mony on "battered woman syndrome." A significant number of impor-
tant legal victories have been won in this general area. Indeed, several
cases which admitted expert testimony on battered woman syndrome,
such as the New Jersey Supreme Court's 1984 decision State v. Kelly,1"
did so on the basis of an extraordinary acceptance of and insight into
feminist theory. Despite my close involvement in developing the theoret-
ical framework of those cases, I was concerned with what I perceived to
be the contradictory implications of this use of expert testimony.
In Describing and Changing,1 76 I argued that the battered woman
syndrome perspective reflected ongoing tensions and paradoxes within
women's self-defense work. Women's self-defense work had been con-
ceived of as a way to remedy the unequal treatment of women that re-
sults from the application of male norms and standards in the criminal
justice system; to assist women to speak in our own voices in the court-
room, and to describe the variety and complexity of our experience. The
aim was to expand the legal options available in defending women
against charges of homicide or assault beyond the traditional pleas of
insanity and incapacity. Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
was developed to explain the common experiences of, and the impact of,
repeated assault on battered women. The goal was to assist the jury and
the court in fairly evaluating the reasonableness of the battered woman's
action. The notion of expert testimony was predicated on an assumption
that battered women's voices would not be understood or were not
strong enough to be heard alone in the courtroom.
However, examination of the cases involving battered women under-
172 See Laura H. Martin, Ohio Joins the Majority and Allows Expert Testimony on the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 6 U. Cin. L. Rev. 877, 903-04 (1992); Schneider, Equal Rights to
Trial, supra note 170, at 638.
173 See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal Educ.
3, 20-25 (1988) (examining manner in which negligence law perpetuates traditional male val-
ues and perspectives); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues
in a Torts Course, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 41, 57-65 (1989) (analyzing gender bias of reason-
able person standard in tort cases).
174 See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 196 n.6.
175 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
176 Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 198-200 (the following five
paragraphs restate the thesis of this Article and excerpt it).
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scored the complexity of the task of expanding defense options for bat-
tered women. These cases revealed the tenacity of sex-stereotyping for,
despite the purpose for which this legal strategy was conceived, old ste-
reotypes of incapacity were replicated in a new form. Lawyers who sub-
mitted testimony focused on the passive, victimized aspects of battered
women's experiences, their "learned helplessness," rather than explain-
ing homicide as a woman's necessary choice to save her own life, and
judges were hearing the testimony in this way. The term "syndrome"
(and the psychological description of battered women that predominates
in "battered woman syndrome") conjures up images of a psychological
defense-a separate defense and/or an impaired mental state defense.
Judicial and public perceptions of battered woman syndrome as a
form of incapacity have had problematic consequences for the defense of
battered women who kill and assert self-defense. The critical defense
problem is how to explain the woman's action as reasonable. The
woman's experience as a battered woman and her inability to leave the
relationship-her victimization-is the context in which that action oc-
curs. When battered woman syndrome is presented or heard in a way
that sounds like passivity or incapacity, it does not address the basic fact
of the woman's action and contradicts a presentation of reasonableness.
Indeed, the overall impact of the battered woman syndrome stereotype
may be to limit rather than expand the legal options of women who can-
not conform to these stereotypes. Judges are not likely to recognize the
need for expert testimony in those cases where the woman's actions sig-
nificantly depart from both the traditional "male" model of self-defense
and the passive "battered woman" model.
The underlying theme throughout these expert testimony cases is
the dilemma that the notion of victimization poses for feminist legal the-
ory. The expert testimony cases suggest that a perspective like battered
woman syndrome, which either emphasizes victimization or is suscepti-
ble to that characterization, raises serious problems for women in theory
and practice.
As work on cases involving battered women who killed their abusers
has unfolded over the last fifteen years, feminist lawyers have grappled
with the dilemma of attempting to educate judges and juries about the
problems of male battering of women, so that these fact finders might
apply fairly the standard of reasonableness. Thus, the argument for ad-
mission of expert testimony on battering was driven by the effort to have
battered women viewed as reasonable.177 The development of specific
177 See Maguigan, supra note 6, at 430 n.182 (listing appellate cases considering admission
of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome for purpose of demonstrating victim's rea-
sonableness); Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 201-02 (explaining pur-
poses of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome).
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psychological descriptions of "battered woman syndrome" flowed from
the need to describe the experiences of women who had been battered in
order to establish their perspectives as reasonable. This work was pre-
mised on the notion that the generic concept of reasonableness could be
transformed by including women's experiences. 17 8
At the same time, another tension riddled this work-the impulse to
reject the general concept of reasonableness and create a separate, more
particular standard. Significantly, although battered women's advocates
intended descriptions of battered women's experiences to illuminate and
expand the traditional concept of what "reasonable" means, quite the
opposite effect often resulted. The more specific and distinct the expert
descriptions of these experiences, encapsulated in the phrase "battered
woman syndrome," the more this testimony suggested a separate stan-
dard: the "reasonable woman" or the "reasonable battered woman."
Judges were eager to see the argument for a separate standard, even
where it had not been made, because then they could reject it.179 Many
lawyers, some feminists and battered women's advocates argued for a
separate standard as well, 180 perhaps because they had given up on the
idea that courts would ever accept a notion of reasonableness that would
take women's experiences and perspectives into account.
Holly Maguigan addresses the popular and widely-held perception
that existing criminal law doctrine, including standards of reasonable-
ness, cannot accommodate the self-defense claims of women who kill
their abusers. Taking note of the scholarship and proposals for legisla-
tive reform in this area and acknowledging that the law of self-defense
has developed largely in a field of male aggressors, Maguigan nonetheless
rejects the assumption that current law ignores the context of a woman
defendant's actions. Instead, she argues that "[i]n most jurisdictions, the
standard of reasonableness against which the necessity of a defendant's
act is measured explicitly includes consideration of the characteristics
and history of the defendant on trial" and of her subjective perception of
threatened harm.' 8 ' She further notes that appellate opinions "do not
support the assumption that most battered women are convicted as the
result of the criminal law's definitional inability to accommodate their
self-defense claims."182 Maguigan also rejects the adoption of a "reason-
able battered woman" or a "reasonable battered woman who kills" stan-
178 Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 1, at 219 (noting that objective reason-
able man standard has been criticized as reflecting male values).
179 Id. at 198-99.
180 See generally Maguigan, supra note 6, at 443-44 & n.n.228-30 (citing Kit Kinports,
Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 Or. L. Rev. 393, 416 (1988)).
181 Id. at 385.
182 Id.
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dard, arguing that such a standard will only be exclusionary and ignore
those who are not "'good' battered women."18 3
The tension between the arguments for a single standard of reasona-
bleness and a separate standard continues. Jury verdicts in battered
women cases underscore the difficulty that jurors have in applying the
general standard to women.' 84 Women are seen as too strong, assertive,
or "together" to fit the definition of victim, particularly when public per-
ceptions of battering are shaped by "battered woman syndrome" as a
kind of learned helplessness.' 8 5 Recent legislative reform efforts to assist
battered women facing criminal trials,1 86 which have included a separate
standard of reasonableness for jury instructions and other criminal law
legislation, have revived the debate.187
We can see resistance to the concept of women's reasonableness in
other contexts. The particular dilemmas of reasonableness in the bat-
tered women's context must be understood in the more general context
of women's subordination. For example, there have been parallel devel-
opments in the law of sexual harassment where courts have now adopted
a "reasonable woman" standard on the theory that women's experiences
with sexual harassment are so distinct that they cannot apply the generic
legal standard of reasonableness.18 8 However, there has been a consid-
183 Id. at 444-45.
184 See id. at 406-32 (analyzing problems of administering current standards).
!85 These stereotypes may particularly penalize women of color. When a battered woman
becomes part of the criminal justice system after killing her abusive partner, racial assumptions
and prejudices can play a critical role in the jury's acceptance of her self-defense plea. Lenore
Walker has noted that the conviction rate of black women who have killed their abusers is
double that of white women. See L. Walker, supra note 21, at 206 (characterizing defendant's
anger as "unacceptable" to jurors).
Sharon Allard argues that the construct of battered woman syndrome may not only ex-
clude the perspective and experiences of black battered women but also may erect additional
obstacles. See Allard, supra note 47, at 204 (asserting that society's "dominant images of
Black women as domineering, assertive, hostile, and immoral may hinder a judge's or juror's
ability to comprehend a Black woman's act of self-defense as based on 'learned helplessness' ").
186 See Maguigan, supra note 6, at 445-47.
187 See id.
188 In recent years, numerous courts adjudicating sexual harassment claims have adopted
the "reasonable woman" standard, an extension of the reasonable victim standard which fo-
cuses on the perspective of the victim rather than that of the alleged perpetrator. See Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that reasonable woman could have found co-
worker's conduct "sufficiently severe and pervasive to ... create an abusive working environ-
ment" where co-worker sent an impassioned letter to plaintiff that severely disturbed her);
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that "person standing in the
shoes of employee should be 'the reasonable woman' since plaintiff in this type of case is re-
quired to be a member of a protected class and is by definition female"); Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that reasonable
woman would find abusive work environment that involved innumerable instances of sexual
jokes, remarks, and pornographic pictures of women); see also Howard A. Simon, Ellison v.
Brady: A "Reasonable Woman" Standard for Sexual Harassment, 17 Employment Rel. LJ.
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erable debate within the field of sexual harassment law about the ade-
quacy of the "reasonable woman" standard as a replacement for the
more traditional "reasonable man" or "reasonable person" standard. 189
The movie "Thelma and Louise" ignited public debate in the summer of
1991 on violence against women and the appropriateness of women's vio-
lent responses, and suggested a vast gender gap between women and men
on these issues. 190 Most significantly, as I was writing this Article, Pro-
71, 78 (1991) (advising that employer should consider "whether a reasonable person in the
victim's shoes would consider the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a condition
of employment and create an abusive working environment"); Ellen Goodman, A Reasonable
Standard, Boston Globe, October 13, 1991, at B3 ("If a jury of car drivers can understand how
a 'reasonable pilot' would see one situation, a jury of men can see how a reasonable woman
would see another event.").
The reasoning behind many courts' adoption of the reasonable woman standard often has
been that the use of the male-biased "reasonable person" standard would only perpetuate ex-
isting norms, maintaining the current level of discrimination against women in the workplace.
See Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] standard which
views harassing conduct from the 'reasonable person' perspective has the tendency to be male-
biased .... In such a case, harassers could continue to discriminate merely because such
harassment was the norm at the workplace."), appeal granted, 487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1992).
This reasoning also incorporates, in many cases, the assumption that men and women have
different perspectives, and that women have common concerns that men don't share. See Elli-
son, 924 F.2d at 878 (observing that "[ec]onduct that many men consider unobjectionable may
offend many women"); Radtke, 471 N.W.2d at 664 ("It is important to analyze and under-
stand the different perspectives of men and women .... Women are more likely to regard a
verbal or physical sexual encounter as a coercive and degrading reminder that the woman is
viewed more as an object of sexual desire than as a credible coworker deserving of respect.").
Courts are careful, however, not to let the reasonable woman appear too sensitive or
idiosyncratic. See Rabidue v. Osceoloa Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,
J., dissenting) ("I would have courts adopt the perspective of the reasonable victim which
simultaneously allows courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield em-
ployers from the neurotic complainant."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Vermett v.
Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 608 (W.D. Mich. 1986) ("[Plaintiff] was not subjected to conditions,
other than those created by her own physical and emotional difficulties, that a reasonable
person would find intolerable."). But see Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1525 ("The fact that some
female employees did not complain of the work environment or find some behaviors objection-
able does not affect this conclusion concerning the objective offensiveness of the work environ-
ment as a whole."); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1209-15 (1989) (advocating that courts consider
whether alleged harasser knowingly exploited particular sensitivities of woman, including
those stemming from her racial, ethnic, or socio-economic background).
189 Compare Abrams, supra note 188, at 1206 (arguing for adoption of standard in sexual
harassment cases that "reflects women's perception of sexual harassment") with Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1177, 1216-19 (1990) (arguing that "reasonable woman" stan-
dard is not neutral and cannot by itself constrain choices judges must make when defining its
limits).
190 The movie Thelma and Louise depicts two women who resort to violence against men in
an effort to escape male violence and the confinement of male society. Its release generated a
considerable amount of popular cultural criticism concerning the ways in which the two
women used violence in retaliation, especially as compared with male violence against women.
See, e.g., Margaret Carlson, Is This What Feminism Is All About?, Time, June 24, 1991, at 57
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fessor Anita Hill alleged that Judge Clarence Thomas had sexually
harassed her, and the Senate Judiciary Committee held its four-day hear-
ing. Although many feminists initially felt hopeful about the possibility
of education on the issue of sexual harassment, the pernicious use of sex-
ist stereotypes that unfolded in the hearing demonstrated public resist-
ance to the notion of women as reasonable. 191 Professor Hill, calm and
(criticizing movie for having women play out male fantasy and showing that Hollywood is still
a man's world); John Leo, Toxic Feminism on the Big Screen, U.S. News and World Rep.,
June 10, 1991, at 20 (criticizing movie as clearly most upsetting of new crop of woman-kills-
man movies and comparing movie's message to fascism); Richard Schickd, Gender Bender,
Time, June 24, 1991, at 52 (documenting raging debate over whether Thelma and Louise cele-
brates liberated females, male bashers, or outlaws); Laura Shapiro et al., Women Who Kill
Too Much: Is Thelma and Louise Feminism, or Fascism?, Newsweek, June 17, 1991, at 63
(same). Many commentators noted that women identified with the retaliatory response of
Thelma and Louise, and some commentators were concerned that the movie advocated an
"open season on men."
Film critics distinguished the violence in Thelma and Louise from conventional societal
representations of male violence, which are generally accepted without controversy. Susan
Sarandon, one of the movie's stars, herself made the comparison between male and female
cinema images of violence:
[The movie's criticism shows] what a straight, white male world movies traditionally
occupy. This kind of scrutiny does not happen to "Raiders of the Lost Ark" or...
["Total Recall"] where [Arnold Schwarzenegger] shoots a woman in the head and says,
"Consider that a divorce."
Schickel, supra, at 56.
Some feminist commentators have remarked that the most disturbing aspect of "Thelma
and Louise" may not be that the women use violence to get what they want, but rather the
message that women who are self-aware and powerful are not permitted to survive in a male-
dominated society. "As film scholar Annette Insdorf puts it, 'When death is your only choice,
how free are you?"' Id. For a discussion of "Thelma and Louise" in the context of women's
role as "outlaw," see Elizabeth V. Spelman & Martha Minow, Outlaw Women: An Essay on
Thelma & Louise, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1281 (1992); see also Susan N. Herman, Thelma and
Louise and Bonnie and Jean: Images of Women as Criminals, I S. Cal. Rev. L & Women's
Stud. (forthcoming 1993).
191 By itself, Anita Hill's testimony was credible. Therefore, she was attacked for being
delusional, which was easier than claiming she was an outright liar. See Felicity Barringer,
Psychologists Try to Explain Why Thomas and Hill Offer Opposing Views, N.Y. Times, Oct.
14, 1991, at A10 (noting that "[t]he question of delusion has been mentioned repeatedly in the
past two days, since John Doggett 3d ... [said] that Ms. Hill had an unreasonable impression
that he was romantically interested in her. He suggested that she may have harbored similar
unreasonable assumptions about Judge Thomas.").
Hill was also portrayed in an unflattering, "unfeminine" light, designed to show that she
was the type of woman who would not have been bothered by dirty movies and the like.
On Friday, she played the role of a meek, innocent, shy Baptist girl from the South who
was the victim of this big bad man. I don't know who she was trying to kid, because the
Anita Hill that I knew and worked with was nothing like that. She ws a very hard,
tough woman; she was opinionated, she was arrogant, she was a relentless debater, and
she was the kind of woman who always made you fee that she was not going to be
messed with, like she was not going to take anything from anyone.
Statements by Character Witnesses in Defense of Judge Thomas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1991, at
A14.
After the hearings concluded, it became clear that Professor Hill's self-confident and com-
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composed, was viewed either as too remote, or as "delusional," while
Clarence Thomas, who exploded in front of the Committee, was viewed
as forceful and reasonable. 192
Public resistance to the concept of a woman's reasonableness under-
scores the long-term nature of our theoretical work. Early work on bat-
tered women perhaps underestimated the difficulty, the obstacles, the
psychological barriers to seeing women as reasonable. The enormous
credibility problems that women face as complainants and witnesses,
most recently dramatized by Anita Hill, seem almost insurmountable.
On the other hand, adoption of a separate standard of reasonableness,
either for battered women in particular, for victims of sexual harassment,
or for women in general, remains problematic. There is no single "rea-
sonable woman," and I worry about the ways that adoption of a separate
standard for battered women in particular or women in general will pe-
nalize women's different experiences and women's departures from a
stereotypical norm.193 It is important to challenge the concept of reason-
posed demeanor had actually undermined, rather than enhanced, her credibility among mem-
bers of the American public. In a telephone poll of 501 adults conducted on October 13, 1991,
58% believed Clarence Thomas more, whereas only 24% believed Anita Hill more. See Eliza-
beth Kolbert, Most in National Survey Say Judge Is the More Believable, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1991, at Al. 46% of those surveyed had an "unfavorable" image of Hill. 54% of the people
surveyed thought that Anita Hill's charges were not true on October 13 (after her testimony);
prior to her testimony (Oct. 9), only 47% had made their minds up that her allegations were
untrue. Id. See also Maureen Dowd, Image More than Reality Became Issue, Losers Say,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1991 ("Many Senators also found Professor Hill n unsympathetic figure
because... she seems too calculating and career-centered .... ").
192 The reactions of the national press to the Thomas confirmation hearings have reflected,
and largely reinforced, national stereotypes of female provocativeness and tendency to hyste-
ria. A surprising, and saddening, number of women publicly asserted their support for Clar-
ence Thomas in spite of the charges brought by Anita Hill. One woman asserted, "she's
consumed with [having power] over him and getting her way." Joyce Price, Thomas Will Not
"Cry Uncle," Eager Callers Sure Where Truth Rests, Wash. Times, Oct. 13, 1991, at Al. An
Atlanta man stated, "[e]very woman who's brought down a major man in the last five years
has made millions of dollars .... I look at what Anita Hill is saying, and I don't believe it."
Id.
Some commentators judged Anita Hill's motives sharply and attributed her claims to a
conspiracy devoted to discrediting a conservative African-American man. "The hysterical
feminists and their thoroughly emasculated male toadies-someone noted the other day that
all the men on National Public Radio sound like women, and vice versa-owe a debt to the
red-baiters of a generation ago." Wesley Pruden, Feminist Hysteria and Sex-Baiting, Wash.
Times, Oct. 9, 1991, at A4. "Anita Hill, by her own words, renders herself a liar in the judg-
ment of reasonable men and women." Id.
A number of reports sought a psychological basis for Hill's claims, and a number of peo-
ple cited actually "diagnosed" Professor Hill as "a victim of erotomania-or the 'Fatal Attrac-
tion' syndrome," perhaps in an effort to distance Hill's experience from the "normal" woman's
workplace experience. See Price, supra.
193 Just like the battered women's cases, there can be no standard "reasonable woman stan-
dard" or even a standard "reasonable harassed woman." Working cla,s women interviewed in
Baltimore all found Anita Hill unbelievable because they claimed they would have stopped the
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ableness in general, bringing to it the wealth of different experiences of
both men and women. We must describe the specificity, the particular-
ity, of these experiences, grounding them in the notion of women's exper-
iences, 194 without incorporating a separate women's standard. Linking
particularity to generality is important in this context as well in order to
assure a more inclusive generality.
III
PARTICULARITY AND GENERALITY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR FEMINIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
Several common threads run through the theme of this Article-the
problem of describing the experience of battering accurately and simulta-
neously being able to translate it to courts. First, although the battered
women's movement has had to demonstrate distinctive aspects of the
problem of battering in order to establish battered women as a legal and
social construct, the characterizations of distinctiveness have been in-
complete, have not explained fully the complex experiences of battering,
and have constrained feminist analysis. I have suggested that we must
reexamine critically some of our implicit assumptions about these char-
acterizations in order both to understand what is distinctive about bat-
tered women's experiences and also to see them in a larger, and more
general, context of violence between intimates.
Second, we must rethink some of the assumptions that have shaped
the movement in order to grapple with new and hard problems-the ex-
perience of lesbian-battering, elder-abuse, the problems of battered
women with abused children, and the complex experiences that battered
women have as mothers. Our characterizations and descriptions of bat-
tered women's particular circumstances and experiences (their particu-
larity) have been inadequate and the incompleteness of these descriptions
of particularity highlight more general themes. Although the develop-
ment of a distinct legal construct concerning male battering of women
has been theoretically important, and strategically necessary, moving to
the more general level of violence between intimates and women's subor-
dination can illuminate theoretical and strategic issues that advance our
work. Focusing only on particularity can be problematic. The develop-
ment of a distinct construct of battered women emerged from the
harassment. Many of them had encountered harassment in the past and said they had put a
stop to it themselves. Lawyers, human services workers, and politicians, on the other hand,
believed Anita Hill. See Felicity Barringer, The Thomas Confirmation: Hill's Case is Divisive
to Women, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1991, at A10.
194 See Christine A. Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, I UCLA
Women's LJ. 15 (1991). I agree with Professor Littleton that feminist theory must focus on
women-but it can also link to larger themes such as violence, as well.
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women's movement as a particular and concrete example of male domi-
nation. Yet paradoxically, our emphasis on particularity, on the distinc-
tiveness of battered women's experiences, has had some unintended
impact of compounding the problems of battered women because we
have insufficiently interconnected battered women's experiences to the
larger and more general problems of women.
This Article has underscored, in a variety of different contexts, the
need to emphasize both particularity and generality in both feminist the-
ory and practice. Although this discussion of the issue of particularity
and generality in feminist theory and practice is preliminary, and part of
a larger project, I hope this Article will stimulate dialogue on this "fertile
ground" 195 for feminist methodology. We must hold on to both particu-
larity (the particular experiences of women who have had relationships
with battering men) and generality (violence and power and control, rea-
sonableness and the larger struggle of women in the world) simultane-
ously. This does not mean denial of the distinctiveness of women's
experiences with woman-abuse. It means both a richer and more de-
tailed description of women's particular problems, an acknowledgment
of abuse as part of a general continuum of violence between intimates,
and an understanding of the way in which particular experiences of
woman-abuse are shaped by more general experiences of motherhood,
unequal and constrained relationships with men, and general societal at-
titudes towards women.
We can see the unintended implications of our emphasis on particu-
larity in work on woman-abuse in practice. In the media and legal and
legislative arenas, problems that battered women face are rarely linked to
women's subservient position within society and the family structure, sex
discrimination in the workplace, economic discrimination, lack of child
care, lack of access to divorce, inadequate child support, problems of
single motherhood, and lack of educational and community support.
The focus is still on the woman and her individual pathology instead of
on the batterer and the social structures that support the oppression of
women and glorify violence. As Susan Schechter has suggested, this
weakens the fight for women's liberation as the larger struggle.' 96 Thus,
both in our feminist theory and our feminist practice, we must self-con-
sciously make the link to the larger women's movement and to more
general issues of gender subordination and place battering in context. If
we are clearer in our descriptions of experience and acknowledge both a
richer particularity and a more inclusive generality, we will be more ef-
fective in making change.
195 See Fineman, supra note 6, at 25-26.
196 See S. Schecter, supra note 37, at 252.
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